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Abstract 
The article discusses the problem of  interpretation of the universe as a whole in the context of 
the modern dialogue between science and religion. It is argued that the very possibility of 
cosmology and theology imply each other. Thus humanity becomes the central problem of the 
dialogue because of its ambivalent position in the universe as being an organic physical being 
on the one hand and the articulating consciousness of the whole universe, on the other hand. 
On the basis of asymmetry in relation between theology and cosmology a methodology of a 
theological treatment of cosmology is suggested as being based in the irreducible primacy of 
the event of living with respect to any possible representation of the universe. A 
phenomenological methodology of “deconstructing” the ideas about the universe is suggested 
with the aim to disclose the source of these ideas in human person.  
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Смысл вселенной: к новому феноменологическому повороту в диалоге 
между космологией и богословием 
 
А. В. Нестерук 
Резюме 
В статье обсуждается проблема интерпретации представлений о вселенной как целого в  
космологии в контексте современного диалога между наукой и религией. 
Показывается, что сама возможность функционирования как космологии так и 
богословия подразумевает их имплицитную включенность друг в друга. Таким 
образом, центральной проблемой диалога становится человек с его двойственной 
позицией в мире как органического существа, так и артикулирующего сознания всей 
вселенной.  Показывается несимметричность отношений между наукой и богословием 
и развивается идея богословского осмысления космологии,  исходя из первичности 
факта жизни по отношению к возможности представлений о вселенной. 
Обосновывается феноменологическая  методология деконструкции «представлений» о 
вселенной с целью нахождения источника базовых идей о ней в человеческой 
личности. 
 
Ключевые слова: Богословская преданность, вера, вселенная, диалог, космология, 
личность, наука, религия, свободное мышление, человек.  
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Introduction 
This paper proposes a new methodology of 
appropriation of modern cosmological 
ideas in the context of the nowadays 
popular dialogue between science and 
religion. It  does not aim to compare 
contemporary cosmological 
mathematically arranged ideas with the 
theologically expressed experience of 
communion with God. The author believs 
that it would be incongruous to bring into 
correlation the cosmological views of the 
Fathers of the Church  (which historically 
had been rooted in ancient Greek 
philosophy and astronomy) with the 
experimental and theoretical results of 
modern cosmology. Similar to this, it 
seems doubtful to conduct a comparative 
hermeneutics of the scriptural texts with 
modern writings on cosmology in an 
attempt to reveal some linguistic parallels: 
such a comparison would exhibit an 
arbitrary approach which is neither 
dictated by the needs of theology nor by 
the logic of science. The author develops 
his argument starting from the premise that 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between 
cosmology, as a definite form of activity 
and thinking, and that philosophico-
theological consciousness which exercises 
its reflection upon cosmology. This 
asymmetry consists in a simple fact that 
although philosophical and theological 
motives enter implicitly any speculations 
on the universe, cosmology, as a scientific 
discipline cannot explicate these motives. 
The motives which are implied here enter 
our discussion as a certain attitude of 
consciousness which is determined by an 
ambivalent position of humanity in the 
universe, that is, on the one hand, being 
included in or contained by the universe, 
and, on the other hand, containing the 
universe as a representation and articulated 
reality within consciousness.  
  
 It follows from what has been said 
that a “comparison” between theology and 
science has sense only in the context of the 
problem of man as a carrier and expositor 
of cosmology as well as theology. It is 
man, humanity that becomes a core 
element and the centre of meaning of the 
dialogue between science and religion; for 
its in human being that the split of 
intentionalities of consciousness  towards 
the objectivised and alienated world on the  
one hand, and towards the underlying 
foundation of the world, as well as the very 
articulating consciousness of this world, 
that is God, on the other hand, takes place.  
Theology and cosmology turn out to be 
intertwined simply because of the 
paradoxical position of humanity in the 
universe, being a physical  and biological 
mechanism in this world, and at the same 
time, being a carrier of the Divine image 
not of this world. 
 
 Let us elucidate this last point. If 
one poses a question: “Why does theology 
needs cosmology?”, a simple empirical 
answer comes to mind. Since the very 
possibility of theology is determined by 
the actual existence of those to theologize, 
that is human persons, then in order to 
theologise one needs necessary physical 
and biological conditions for existence of 
these persons, which, as it is not difficult 
to comprehend, are rooted in cosmic 
conditions. It is cosmology that explicates 
these necessary conditions. From here one 
infers that any theological proposition, 
expressing experience of the Divine in the 
world implicitly contains in itself truth 
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about that very world, where this 
experience occurs. 
 
 If one inverts the above question 
and asks: “Why does cosmology needs 
theology?”, one can respond to it through 
the following observation. Cosmology 
predicates  the factual state of affairs in the  
physical universe without  elucidating the 
sense of their contingent facticity and 
hence without clarifying the sense of the 
sufficient conditions which are in the 
foundation the very possibility of 
knowledge and explication of the universe 
by human persons. Theology interprets this 
point by pointing out that only human 
beings have the rational ability to  
transcend the boundaries of the physical 
finite, including their bodies and the 
attuned living space and integrate in their 
consciousness the sense of the infinite and 
eternal.  Consciousness and reason 
characterise the human condition in the 
universe and cannot be explained through 
their reduction to the physical thus 
remaining an inexplicable mystery whose 
elucidation and interpretation is possible 
only through the recourse to theology of 
the Divine image in man. Correspondingly 
any cosmological proposition about the 
world becomes implicitly theologically 
imbued with faith in the reality of the good 
creation of the Good God  and with the gift 
to contemplate in the reality the signs of 
the Creator.  
 
 The same can be expressed 
philosophically. Since theology as well as 
cosmology are products of one and the 
same human subjectivity, that is two 
different types of the living experience and 
self-comprehension of its place in being,  
no existential contradiction between these 
two types of experience is possible.  The 
contradiction appears only when 
experience of living is reduced to the 
phenomenality of objects where the 
presence of the human insight in the world 
is lost and the structure of the world is 
infolded from the position of some 
disincarnate subject. What is missed in this 
treatment of the world is that the very 
possibility of such an objective picture of 
the world is still rooted in the innate 
“simultaneous synthesis of the universe” as 
an inherent feature of consciousness of a 
physically real person. 
 
 A careful insight into cosmological 
ideas allows one to discover the presence 
of the human subjectivity even in those 
conditions when cosmology attempts  to 
“crush this subjectivity under the pile of 
astronomical facts”. Here a genuine human 
theological fidelity is revealed when 
humanity resists this crushing and remains 
faithful to its intrinsic conviction of the 
centrality of its position in the universe, of 
being the centre of disclosure and 
manifestation of all powers and processes 
in the it.  To restore the central status of 
humanity in the universe through an 
existential and phenomenological 
“deconstruction” of cosmology will mean 
top uncover the hidden theological 
commitment in cosmological research.   
 
 Such a methodological position 
with respect to the elucidation of the sense 
of cosmology positions the philosophy 
employed as not a “neutral” form of 
thought, but as imbued with existential 
meaning and  theological connotations for  
a philosophical reflection as well as 
scientific theories are “inserted” (bracketed 
in) in experience of existence, that is 
experience of communion with God as the 
source of this existence. Thus this 
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methodology aims to conduct the 
philosophical analysis of those logical 
operations of the human mind in research 
of the universe  from within a hidden 
philosophico-theological “obviousness” 
which is essential to all acts of 
consciousness, including scientific ones. 
Starting from this obviousness cosmology 
is explicated as a certain way of 
interrogating the reality of the world as 
well as that of human beings themselves. 
Such a philosophically and theologically 
“enlightened” treatment of cosmology, 
despite its sheer deviation from  main-
stream  science is, in our opinion, very 
timely because it elucidates not only an 
existential sense of what cosmologists 
speak of the universe, but also the sense of 
what they are speaking of themselves, that 
is of human beings incarnate in this 
universe and capable of speculating about 
it. Thus the main interest of this article is 
not so much in the sense of physical 
realities which cosmology attempts to 
constitute, but in the ways this constitution 
originates in the anthropological and 
psychological aspects of humanity’s 
existence which express  basic anxieties of 
existence, its theological  mystery.  Our 
interest is not in describing of that which is 
in the universe as if this description would 
be self-evident and not needing any further 
analysis,  but in investigating  of how this 
very description became possible. This is a 
philosophical objective which cannot be 
fulfilled without recourse to theology. 
Correspondingly, the search for the 
ultimate foundations of cosmological 
knowledge cannot avoid a certain 
“theological commitment” which is related 
to the stance on the nature and essence of 
the knowing subject.1 At the same time the 
                                                
1 Jean Ladrière expressed a thought that in order to 
enquiry into those original conditions in 
the study of the universe without which 
this study would not be possible explicates 
this hidden theological commitment. The 
analysis of the conditions of knowledge is 
called in philosophy “transcendental”. This 
analysis deals with two fundamental 
issues: 1) the intrinsic interlink between 
human consciousness and the possibility of 
sensing, judging and reasoning about the 
universe; in short:  the universe can be 
presented in thought and knowledge only 
as constituted within certain transcendental 
delimiters related to the structures of 
embodied subjectivity; 2) it is because of 
the physical and epistemological 
incommensurability between the universe 
and human beings, that the universe 
always remains a transcendent background 
of any transcendental knowledge. The 
“relationship” between the universe and 
human beings is established on the 
principles of freedom, that is free thinking 
(related to what Kant called the  faculty of 
reflective judgement,  and theologians call 
free will). This freedom implies that the 
universe and humanity interact on the 
ways of their mutual constitution: the 
universe is a never accomplished  mental 
creation whereas human subjectivity is the 
                                                                    
explicate the analogy between the deep structure of 
nature and the structure of human existence as 
openness, creativity, possibility etc., one needs to 
enter what he called the “domain of the word” 
which, in our parlance, would correspond to 
thought within the “theological commitment”: “The 
problematic of nature can thus be linked  with the 
problematic of human existence. Still there is no 
continuity between these two domains. There are 
perhaps indications pointing in a certain direction 
but it is not within the power of cosmological 
thought, even when developed, to become a 
consideration of finality, to enter the domain of the 
word. Only by meditation on what properly belongs 
to the word can one open another way of 
understanding (if one exists), leading 
towards…faith” (Ladrière 1972, p. 186). 
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self-correcting structural unity of 
apperception, the unity which originates in 
the thought (intuition and imagination) of 
infinity of the universe.  A theological 
stance in this  transcendental analysis is 
that humanity remains free and responsible 
in its thinking of the universe, because this 
thinking implies free action, free 
judgement and choice  of theoretical 
options, which is not subordinated either to 
the rigidity of the structures of subjectivity, 
or to the material content of the universe. 
A theological stance is the possibility of 
transcendence in cognitive actions, the 
transcendence either as longing for the 
incommensurable content of the universe, 
or as a resistance to any forms of thought 
which position humanity as part of the 
cosmic determinism, denying its ability to 
avoid the dissolution and crush by the 
mounting  number of facts about the 
universe.2 Finally, a theological stance in 
the transcendental analysis of cosmology, 
                                                
2 This is a different way of expressing that which 
Gabriel Marcel asserted in 1940 in his book  Du 
Refus a l’Invocation (Marcel 1940), when he 
discussed a paradox related to the representation of 
the universe as and object: “The more I insist on the 
objectivity of things, thus cutting off the umbilical 
cord which binds them to my existence, that one 
which I call my organo-physical presence to 
myself, the more I affirm the independence of the 
world from me, its radical indifference to my 
destiny, my goals; the more the world thus 
proclaimed as the only real one,  is converted into 
an illusory spectacle, a great documentary film 
offered for my curiosity, but which is ultimately 
abolished because of a simple fact that it ignores 
me. I mean that the universe tends to be annihilated 
in the measure that it overwhelms me. And this, I 
believe, is that which is forgotten whenever one 
attempts to crush man under the weight of 
astronomical facts” (p. 32). N. Berdyaev also was 
worried about the dominating power of nature upon 
human beings by calling it “slavery to nature”. To 
relieve   oneself from this slavery one must exercise 
an “active resistance to those impersonal forces of 
the world which desires to tear in pieces and 
enslave it” (Berdyaev 1944,  p. 49)(translation 
corrected).  
is the commitment to the view that the 
very facticity of the subject of 
transcendental knowledge, that is a human 
person, originates in and through 
communion with the divine, as the giver of 
life and provider of its image.   
 
 The study of cosmology through 
the prism of the philosophically and 
theologically weighted mind is not in tune 
with the modern way of treating the real in 
terms of the palpable and scientifically 
representable matter. In this sense such a 
study is untimely, that is out of tune with 
the present, in the same way as philosophy, 
which deals with the phenomena (in our 
case the universe) that cannot encounter 
any immediate response from wider 
humanity, is untimely. Thus philosophical 
enquiry in cosmology imbued with a 
theological commitment reveals itself in an 
autonomous existence such that it makes 
things more difficult and complicated. 
However, here lies the advantage of a 
philosophical interrogation of cosmology 
as an autonomously functioning 
consciousness above and beyond that 
mass-consciousness which functions in the 
natural attitude.  Sceptics and nihilists, 
whose presence among intellectuals bears 
a sign of our times,  can raise a disarming 
question as to whether it is worth doing at 
all: “What for to study the foundations of 
the universe?”, or, correspondingly, “What 
for to understand the sense of humanity?” 
The response to these questions comes 
from the definition of philosophy as love 
for wisdom (philo-sophia) and truth 
(aletheia) which imply love in general as a 
major characteristic of the human 
condition understood theologically.  To 
enquire into the sense of the universe  
means not only to know it, but to be in 
communion with it, to love it. The 
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philosophically and theologically oriented 
cosmology is not “knowledge” achievable 
and ready to use. This philosophical 
cosmology belongs to the realm of those 
perennial aspects of the human quest for 
the sense of being which can be addressed 
only in the rubrics of the so called negative 
certitude3 pertaining to the long-lived 
traditional theology which does not 
provide us with a definite discursive 
judgement on the existence of God and 
what God is; this question drives the 
human reason only to one possible answer: 
it is certain, but this certainty is negative, 
so that one cannot answer this question in 
rubrics of reason alone.    In similarity with 
theology when cosmology dares to 
predicate the “universe as a whole”, or 
“multiverse” (the plurality of the worlds), 
the outcome of this predication does not 
resolve the present scientific uncertainty 
about their actual existence, rather it brings 
us back to the same “negative certitude” in 
which no answer to the question of 
“What?”, “Why?” etc. related to the 
universe  as a whole is possible.   
 
  Correspondingly a philosophical 
enquiry within a theological commitment 
in cosmology cannot be judged on the 
grounds of some simplified either 
                                                
3 Positive certitude is typical for the sciences 
dealing with knowledge of objects can be described 
as that science operates with some precarious and 
incomplete data about these objects which are 
amended and corrected   in the course of science’s 
progress.  The paradox of science is exactly in that 
this uncertainty, corrigibility of its results is the 
condition for science to function at all. Another 
aspect of science is that it cannot know things in the 
context of the wholeness of the world. By contrast 
in philosophy, in what concerns its perennial 
questions about the world as a whole, there is no 
visible progress, so that it is able to speculate about 
the world only in rubrics of what is called by Jean-
Luc Marion negative certitudes. (See details of this 
concept in (Marion 2010). 
scientific or common sense criteria. 
Philosophical cosmology within a 
theological commitment characteristically 
contributes to understanding and formation 
of humanity through its interaction with 
the universe. It represents cosmology as a 
general strategy of acquisition of the 
world, the strategy which as such 
manifests the ongoing incarnation of 
humanity in the universe, or in rather 
theological terms, the “humanisation” of 
the cosmos. In this sense philosophical 
cosmology within a theological 
commitment is directly related to 
philosophical anthropology as well as to 
the discourse of personhood. Both of them 
are concerned with the ancient question 
raised in Greek philosophy “why is there 
existence rather than nothing?” 
Contemporary physical cosmology 
attempts to respond to this question, 
however its forms of thought remain 
intrinsically unadjusted to this type of 
interrogation. Saying differently, 
cosmology is content with what it says in 
physical terms and what one says about it 
as it exists. However to understand the 
sense of cosmology one needs to establish 
a new type of “questioning  of cosmology” 
in which thinking is evolving beyond what 
was stated by cosmology itself. Here one 
needs an “enlightened” reason, or, as it 
was expressed by Nietzshe, a “great 
reason” which, on the one hand, is 
associated with the embodiment in flesh of 
the universe and which would represent 
cosmology as a specific way of 
appropriation of the world. On the other 
hand this “great reason” is related to the 
Divine image in man, which humanity 
attempts to restore and fulfil, making thus 
the process of the humanisation of the 
universe its communion with the Divine.  
In this sense any philosophical cosmology 
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confesses a free type of thinking which is 
not constrained by the findings of the 
scientific and thus transcends physical 
cosmology by bringing it to the next circle 
of understanding the essence of being and 
humanity. The issue is not to think of the 
essence of cosmology, which would be 
equivalent to being restricted to its 
contemporary forms, regardless as to 
whether we judge it positively or 
negatively. It is important to realise that by 
questioning cosmology philosophically 
and theologically we overcome its seeming 
neutrality with respect to us thus 
advancing our understanding of the very 
being of cosmology as being in us. 
Cosmology is acting in producing its 
theories, but it does not think in a 
philosophical sense (compare with a 
famous Heidegger’s assertion that science 
does not think). The sense of cosmology 
can become enlightened only when the 
gulf between its particular theories and 
human thinking in general  is realised. 
 
 To establish the sense of 
cosmology starting from cosmology itself, 
this cosmology must evolve in a radically 
reflective, that is,  transcendental mode, 
that is, in fact, to become philosophy. The 
sense of its theories can be grasped only 
within a critique originating in experience. 
And there is the realm of transcendental 
self-experience which can be established 
through  a method of phenomenological 
reduction. This reduction aims to 
overcome a “natural naïveté”, that  is, a 
belief in that cosmology only deals with 
the things of the outer world. Its ultimate 
objective could be seen as questioning the 
neutrality  of cosmological 
propositions (their invariance) with respect 
to specific historically contingent events of 
knowing. To remove the elements in this 
contingency would imply the return to 
those irreducible certainties which would 
represent the universe as pertaining to the 
essence of one’s conscious life. It is from 
this life, with its mundane experiences, 
that the universe is constituted on the basis 
of its phenomenality. Life is understood 
here not anymore as an empirical psycho-
physiological life which belongs to the 
universe, but as the transcendental self-
apprehension which comes forth and from 
within which the universe emerges as its  
intentional correlate. By inverting this last 
proposition, one can assert that it is 
through cosmology that transcendental 
subjectivity is revealed as overcoming its 
own incarnate boundaries. Indeed, by 
stripping off the layers of the physical and 
biological one comes to discover that the 
universe as a whole appears as an 
intentional correlate of transcendental 
consciousness. Thus “putting out of play”  
the contingent aspects of the universe 
brings cosmology to a discourse of the 
transcendental subject, as that centre of 
disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe through which the latter acquires 
its own “voice”.4  
 
 However, even this transcendental 
reduction does not guarantee that we do 
not fall into a “transcendental naïveté”. 
This naivety amounts to thinking that 
reality presupposes the transcendental 
subject as that pre-given context-horizon 
within which this reality unfolds. But this 
transcendental subject still functions as an 
embodied creature, that is in the world of 
physical things. However the very physical 
things do exist for this subject only as 
constituted by him. With regard to the 
                                                
4 C.f. (Torrance 2001, p. 2). See also 
(Clément1976, pp. 102-3). 
 8 
universe as a whole the situation is 
different: its alleged totality cannot be 
constituted by the subject but, vice versa, 
the subject itself is being constituted by the 
universe (not in a trivial physical sense). In 
order to clarify this thought one must 
remind the reader that cosmology, as a 
historically concrete science, is capable of 
making its claims on the structure and 
evolution of the universe within the limits 
of what can be called “positive 
incertitude”, that is that certainty which is 
local in time and is subject to amendment 
and falsification.  This can be expressed in 
different words as that scientific 
conceptual signifiers never exhaust the 
content of that which is supposed to be 
signified. “Positive incertitude” in  science 
can also be described in terms of the so 
called apophaticism (which is well known 
since patristic times in theology) asserting 
a simple truth that the appearances of 
things and constitutions by the finite 
consciousness deal with a particular, 
incomplete phenomenality which pertains 
to objects.  With regard to things beyond 
simple perception and nominations which 
exceed the capacity of constitution and 
phenomenality, one can conjecture only in 
terms of aberrations and approximations. 
The fact that we can see and speculate 
about some aspects of the universe does 
not entail that there are no other aspects of 
existence than those which are present and 
perceived by us, but whose presence 
cannot be affirmed in terms of 
consciousness and knowledge. A simple 
physical example of such a hidden aspect 
of the universe is its dark matter and dark 
energy that constitute, according to theory 
96% of the overall matter content of the 
universe. However, the phenomenality of 
these theoretical constructs is poor: physics 
does not know what particular particles 
and field stand behind these constructs. A 
philosophical example of concealment 
related to the universe as a whole can be 
taken as its own contingent facticity, the 
sense of which cannot probably be 
disclosed to humanity at all.  Indeed, the 
notion of the universe as a whole,  which is 
claimed to be a subject matter of 
cosmology, allows one only to have some 
precarious and incomplete definitions 
related to the fundamental finitude (spatial, 
temporal, historical etc) of the subject of 
knowledge. However this “positive 
incertitude” of cosmology does not mean 
that  from a philosophical point of view  
one must disdain cosmology as irrelevant 
to any perennial questions. It just implies 
that the cosmological research has to 
proceed along the lines of the scientific 
method in clear understanding that the 
universe as a whole will never  be 
constituted at all. Then the persistence of 
cosmology exhibits the courage and 
heroism of scientists in following their 
quest for the universe despite the ultimate 
futility of any hope to have this universe as 
an object of science. The same takes place 
in theology when believers explicate their 
experience of God as an open-ended 
process in a clear consciousness that the 
true names of the Divine are beyond this 
age and any denominations. 
Correspondingly, in cosmology the 
persistence of research as a purposive 
activity of humanity is pointing towards its 
telos, that is the telos of research, which, as 
such is also beyond this age and any 
denominations.  Here is a fundamental 
paradox of cosmology, as well as any other 
science, namely, that its incertitude is that 
condition of its progress consisting in the 
unceasing correction and amendment of its 
results and theories. However, in spite of 
the fact that a human person cannot 
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constitute the universe, so that the universe 
saturates its intuition and blocks the 
reason, this person remains an independent  
centre of disclosure and manifestation of 
the universe, resisting any attempt to  be 
crushed by the grandeur of being. In this 
sense the “negative  certitude” in relation 
to knowledge of the universe, turns out to 
be a constructive certitude of constituting 
the human subject. By interacting with the 
infinity of the universe human persons 
form themselves: in the measure that 
humanity is incapable of constituting the 
universe as a whole, the human person is 
constituted by the universe as an “object” 
of humanity’s constant interest and anxiety 
of its own position in it. This means that 
the transcendental subject which 
appropriates the universe into the sphere of 
its own subjectivity and which is destined 
to carry out the phenomenological 
reduction with the goal of revealing the 
immanent belonging of the universe to 
consciousness of the subject, is the 
forming and changing subject, who is 
formed and changed through this very 
appropriation.  One can summarise by 
saying that the understanding of the sense 
of cosmology implies the understanding of 
the formation of self-consciousness of 
humanity’s position in the universe subject 
to one important condition:  the 
cosmological picture does not diminish the 
place of man in the universe as the centre 
of its disclosure and manifestation. The 
more cosmology proves that human being 
is no more than a speck of dust in the 
universe, the more the human person 
resists this by defending the sense of its 
existence. That which has been said 
partially explains the sense of what we 
asserted earlier that the human “I” is 
constituted by the universe.   
 
 But the shift of the centre of 
cosmological   enquiry into the life of 
transcendental subjectivity still retains the 
same perennial question of the facticity of 
this very subjectivity. If it is claimed that 
the characteristic feature of personal 
existence, that is human hypostatic being, 
is its ability to resist scientific tendencies 
of denigrating humanity by dissolving it in 
the natural  and cosmic, and, hence, to 
understand the cosmic conditions of the 
human existence only as the necessary 
ones, then the question arises as to what is 
the ground and foundation  of the 
contingent facticity of  hypostatic 
existents, that is persons, that is where do 
the sufficient conditions of the human 
existence come from?  Certainly one can 
take a classical existentialist’s position 
which makes this last question devoid of 
any sense, for one cannot abstract from the 
already present event of life. However this 
stance is unsatisfactory for a theologically 
inclined mind, who  wants to see in the 
very fact of conscious existence the 
manifestation of truth (aletheia) in an 
absolute sense. So that the acceptance of 
conscious existence  as an absolute 
reference point of any further 
philosophising implies belief in the truth of 
existence. Thus the knowledge of the 
universe as unfolded from within the 
human subjectivity is by its essence 
committed to a simple existential faith. For 
a sceptical scientist or for a modern atheist 
it would be problematic to proceed from  
existential faith to religious faith, that is to 
the conviction that truth has foundation in 
God, for any reference to the Divine would 
imply transcendence, principally 
impossible in science and prohibited by the 
very essence of the phenomenological 
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reduction.5 However, and this is our main 
point, the very reduction as well as the 
functioning of consciousness will be 
impossible at all if the reference to the 
source of its contingent facticity would be 
eidetically removed. In such a case the 
removal of God as the foundation of 
consciousness would lead inevitably to a 
suggestion that there must be another, 
transworldy foundation of this 
consciousness which would be analogous 
to the idea of God, that God which was 
previously bracketed out. Correspondingly 
we return back to  the assertion that any 
hypothetical reduction of God would imply 
the cessation of functioning of 
consciousness itself. This  is one of the 
motivations of contemporary 
phenomenology to argue that even if 
facticity of consciousness cannot be 
justified, it can at least be explicated 
through dealing with the saturated 
phenomena which, in a way, constitute this 
consciousness. 6 
 
 To understand the sense of 
cosmology within a theological 
commitment is thus to understand the 
existential sense of the universe, or, to be 
more precise, to “understand” what it 
means to think of or commune with the 
universe. What could it mean the thinking 
of or communion with the universe in the 
conditions of a scientific and technological 
age in order to avoid this thinking being 
enslaved by the sphere where knowledge is 
                                                
5  One can point to Husserl, who in his 
Ideas I (§58) subjected God to reduction, 
bracketing it and depriving it of any trans-
conscious status (Husserl 1998). 
6 For a systematic approach to such phenomena see 
(Marion 2002). See my paper (Nesteruk 2014) 
where the idea of saturated phenomena is applied to 
the universe. 
operated according to some social, but still 
historically contingent standards? 
Correspondingly, how could we dress this 
thinking in words while avoiding all 
cultural superstitions which engulf our 
language? And even in the case where we 
believed that we have achieved such a 
goal, could we expect any recognition of 
that form of thinking which intentionally 
extends beyond the view of the universe 
which is framed by varieties of scientific 
projects, conference discussions and 
numerous publications? All these 
questions implicitly presuppose that the 
scientific way of thinking of the universe  
does not cover the fullness of our 
communion with the universe which is 
concealed in the very fact of our existence. 
This concealment follows, for example, 
from the fact that humanity is able to 
interact not only with the physical world of 
corporeal objects, but also with the realm 
of intelligible forms, to which cosmology 
can attest only indirectly. To think of the 
universe is thus to explicate the sense of 
the universe on existential grounds, where 
our understanding of the adjective 
“existential” follows from the sense which 
was asserted by existentialists in the 20th 
century, namely, that human life and 
existence is the primary and 
unquestionable metaphysical fact from 
which the whole reality is unfolded.7 And 
this, as we have mentioned above, 
contributes to the perennial issue of  how 
to think of humanity. Thinking of the 
universe in existential categories thus 
implies the extended vision and perception 
                                                
7 Our usage of the adjective “existential” must be 
carefully distinguished from the same adjective 
which is sometimes used by cosmologists in the 
context of the stated smallness and insignificance of 
humanity in the universe; see, for example,  
(Primack, Abrams, 2006, pp. 273-78). 
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of the universe, which, in words of a 7th 
century Byzantine, Saint Maximus the 
Confessor, is the makro-anthropos, that is 
that which was created in order to be 
humanised.    
 
 To think of the universe on the 
grounds of existential communion entails 
freedom of such thinking. It does not 
necessarily imply the overthrowing of 
scientific authority in the questions of 
physical cosmology: it implies that 
cosmological theories and hypotheses can 
be interpreted not as propositions about 
outer realities but as movements of the 
human heart and spirit which reflect a 
fundamental anxiety of existence. In this 
case the universe is perceived as a  certain 
whole, whose partial phenomenality is 
explicated by science. This whole includes 
not only the physically fragmented or 
united cosmos, but it includes the infinity 
of human life (the infinity of relations of 
human beings to created existents) in the 
universe. Correspondingly all accumulated 
forms of knowledge, established in history 
to this very date, are merely pieces and 
moments, temporary and provisional 
sketches of the immensely mysterious 
phenomenon of personal beings. The “non-
technlogical” thinking of the universe, 
even if it will not be able to reproduce this 
“whole of the universe” (which was, 
however, attempted in works of art and 
poetry) and hence will remain no more 
than a symbol rather than reality, can 
receive its justification in a deep hope, that 
through this thinking we learn something 
of ourselves which has never been present 
in our vision of all.  Being an intentional 
thinking, thinking of the universe as a 
whole brings that one who thinks beyond 
any conditional objectification  and 
positivity which could seem as that which 
fulfils this thinking. In a way, thinking of 
the universe is transcending the limits of 
thought at all which   requires from the 
enquirer exceptional discipline, courage 
and humility in front of the fact that the 
task will never be fulfilled and that they  
are ready to learn of themselves something 
which could shatter the image of their own 
“I”. 8 
 
 By thinking of the universe as a 
whole, we attempt to explicate our 
intrinsically ambivalent existential 
situation, being a part of the universe, in its 
particular time and space, and at the same 
time being at “that” paradoxically central 
“nowhere” from which the wholeness of 
the universe is unfolded. Some 
cosmologists can object to this by saying 
that in terms of time we are living in a very 
special era in the universe, that it is only 
now that it is possible to detect the 
universe’s evolution, its origin in the Big 
Bang etc.9 The universe as described by 
specific cosmological theories is not 
contingent from the point of view of these 
models. However, from the point of view 
of the very possibility of such a 
description, that is from the point of view 
of the contingent facticity of life of 
knowing persons, it is still contingent. The 
pole of “nowhere” remains intact simply 
because cosmology, which deals with the 
physical background for existence of 
embodied human persons (that is, its 
necessary conditions) is not able to shed 
the light on the nature of the sufficient 
conditions of existence of intelligent 
observers and theoreticians of  the 
universe. It is this pole of “nowhere” in 
thinking of the universe that deprives this 
                                                
8 C.f. (Primack, Abrams 2006, p. 282), (Ladrière 
1972, p.150). 
9 See, for example, (Krauss 2012, pp. 118-19). 
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thinking of any essential historical goal, 
which could be placed at the service of any 
intellectual or social-political economy, if 
it is not related to the saving ideals of   
Christianity. Being engaged in thinking of 
the universe as a whole we are immersed 
not so much into the present of the 
scientific discourse of the universe but into 
the present of thinking itself.  And this 
present is dictated not only by  the advance 
of contemporary physical theories of the 
universe but to a great extent by the 
advance of thinking per se, that is its free 
philosophical mode which is not subjected 
to the logic of the already known but 
follows that which Husserl  called 
humanity’s “infinite tasks” (Husserl 1970, 
p. 279). Here it is appropriate to quote K. 
Jaspers, rephrasing a little his text, that our 
historical consciousness of the universe, in 
spite of being a temporal phenomenon, is a 
“free-flying” consciousness without “any 
ground and original point  accessible to 
knowledge, ultimately rooted  in that  
source which is always and necessarily 
present in ourselves” (Jaspers 1982, p. 77). 
This type of thinking, flying away from 
mundane realities and technological 
delimiters, will reveal deeper and clearer 
the fact of our, as Heidegger termed it,  
“planetary homelessness” (but still 
centrality) which pertains to the present 
intellectual, social and political 
unpredictability of the human condition.  
One must, perhaps, amplify this point by 
using the term “cosmic homelessness” 
implying the lack of understanding of the 
human place in the whole universe. We are 
homeless because the universe is infinite, 
and in spite of some claims of our 
centrality in the universe, we still do not 
know our place in it, that is we do not 
know scientifically the grounds of our 
facticity in it. What we know for sure, 
however, is  that it is us who articulate the 
universe, so that, perhaps, as some claim, 
we are in the centre of the universe, but the 
question of “where” this very centre 
ultimately is, remains in the field of 
perennial certitudes négatives.  
 
 While Jaspers could say that the 
realisation of “cosmic homelessness” (as 
the denial of the historical consciousness) 
becomes “the metaphysical consciousness 
of being (Sein), which being constantly 
present, must become evident in true being 
(Dasein), as if in eternally present” (Ibid.), 
according to Heidegger, our “cosmic  
homelessness”, that is inability to answer 
questions about own essence,  drops a 
shadow of doubt with regard to being of 
the universe itself (our “cosmic 
homelessness” can be qualified as non-
being).10 Then it is from this perspective of 
our own finitude, mortality, non-
attunement to  and incommensurability 
with the universe  that one must have the 
courage  to think of the universe in order to 
assert ourselves. However this assertion of 
ourselves has a particular spiritual 
importance only for those who still value 
the humanity of the humans, naturalness of 
nature, justice of the police, and other 
perennial  values which crown man in the 
                                                
10 It is worth recalling Kierkegaard expressed in a 
dramatic form his anxiety about the impossibility to 
describe one’s position in being: “One sticks his 
finger in the ground in order to judge where one is. 
I stick my finger in existence — it feels like 
nothing. Where am I? What is the ‘world’? What 
does this word mean? Who has duped me into the 
whole thing, and now leaves me standing there? 
Who am I? How did I come into the world; why 
was I not asked, why was I not informed of the 
rules and regulations… How did I come to be 
involved in this great enterprise called actuality? 
Why should I be involved in it? Am I not free to 
decide? Am I to be forced to be part of it? Where is 
the manager, I would like to make a complaint!” 
(Kierkegaard 2009, p. 60). 
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centre of the world, for whom this world is 
given to fulfil the “infinite” task of finding 
its destiny in the union with the Creator of 
the universe and the giver of life. Thinking 
of the universe leads one to thinking of 
God and it is in this that  this thinking 
follows a hidden theological commitment.  
 
It is not difficult to see that 
thinking of the universe as if we think of 
the thinking itself at present, allows one to 
establish certain liturgical connotations as  
articulations of the overall temporal span 
of the universe, its past, present and future 
in conscious acts which fight oblivion 
which pertains to the eternal flux of being. 
When articulated, the universe is being 
remembered not only as its realised past. 
The question of active remembrance of the 
universe, is the question of such an 
understanding of human life in which past, 
present and future are not considered 
anymore as signs of the all-annihilating 
Kronos, but as being able to be integrated 
through remembrance in the image of 
humanity living in tension between a 
thanksgiving for existence and a hope for 
its non-transient sense.11 To study the 
universe does not mean  to establish a 
simple vision of the world on the grounds 
of mundane curiosity or personal needs. It 
rather forms a vision of that “selfhood” of 
the universe (as the makro-anthropos) 
which is truly important for one’s 
existence and which brings to 
unconcealment  the truth of the human 
existence. When we speak of the “self” of 
the universe, we do not presume that it 
                                                
11 As was suggested elsewhere the universe as its 
past, even if  human beings know their meaning 
only precariously, can be respected, as certain 
ancestors of our being, so that this respect can 
establish a sense of communion  with the universe 
which overcomes loneliness and despair (Primack, 
Abrams 2006, p. 291). 
does have hypostatic  features but, 
allegorically speaking, humanity by 
looking at the “face” of the universe, sees 
this “face” as looking at themselves, and it 
is this all-penetrating “glance” of the 
makro-anthropos that forms the image of 
humanity as its ability to see the infinite in 
the finite. In a certain sense human beings, 
as they are sustained by this last mentioned 
glance, want to respond to it thus asserting 
not only their longing for the 
commensurability with the universe, but 
also their infinitely transcending lordship 
over the universe resisting their 
cosmographic insignificance and a fear of 
being crushed under the weight of 
astronomical facts. Pascal compared man 
with reed, thinking reed, in the universe, 
the weakest but thinking element in the 
chain of being, so that a drop of water can 
kill a man and the universe does not need 
to arm itself in order to crush man. “But 
even if the universe should crush him, man 
still would be more noble than that which 
kills him, since he knows he is mortal, and 
knows that the universe is more powerful 
than he is: but the universe itself knows 
nothing of it. All our dignity, then consists 
in thought. It is through thought  alone that  
we have to lift ourselves up, and not 
through space or time which we cannot 
fill.”12   
 
 The freedom in  thinking of the 
universe, however, has its delimiters; this 
freedom does not imply an arbitrary rule in 
this thinking, first of all its spiritual 
arbitrariness. When we brought the reader 
to the thought that thinking of the universe 
is accompanied by thinking of God, we 
were conscious that there always was a 
                                                
12 (Pascal 1962,  p. 199 (c.f. p. 113)) [English 
translation: (Pascal 1959, p. 78 (c.f. p. 39)]. 
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danger of a “divinisation” of the universe. 
Here one means not a naïve and outdated 
pagan perception of the cosmos as a living 
organism or the place where gods 
corresponding to different  astronomical 
objects are abiding.  It is a much more 
refined form of spirituality which is 
implied here, rooted in the sense of 
immanence of the universe, its infinity as 
an actually existent mystery which does 
not need any reference to the personal 
trans-worldly ground of the world. 
Cosmology in this case becomes a spiritual 
exercise since it is based in the life of the 
spirit; however, the demarcation between 
such a “spiritual cosmology” and 
theological commitment arises at that point 
when human beings make a distinction 
between the universe as a necessary 
condition of their existence (that is an 
immanent medium of their inhabitation) on 
the one hand, and God, as an underlying 
transcendent sufficient  ground of the very 
possibility of life and vision of the 
universe on the other hand. Speaking 
theologically, there is here a difference of a 
soteriological  order, so that to avoid 
arbitrariness in thinking of the universe 
means to follow a  theological 
commitment referred to the salvific sense 
of the universe.  A difference of a 
soteriological kind was pointed out by V. 
Lossky when he commented on the place 
of cosmology in the writings of the Fathers 
of the Church and, in particular, in the case 
if cosmology looses the sense of the 
centrality of humanity in the perspective of 
salvation, for example: “…copernican 
cosmology, from a psychological or rather 
spiritual point of view, corresponds to a 
state of religious dispersion or off-
centredness, a relaxation of the 
soteriological attitude, such as found in the 
gnostics or the occult religions” (Lossky 
1957, p. 195). An example of such  a 
dispersion and relaxation of the 
soteriological attitude can be found in 
modern “spirituality without God” 
according to which the immanence with 
the world going together with no belief at 
all (for  there is nothing to believe in since 
everything is already here and now), 
despair (as no hope for anything since 
everything  has already happened) 
correspond to that a human being   is 
already there, in that reality, which 
theology names the age to come (Comte-
Sponville, 2006). Thus, if the state of 
affairs is such as it is just described, the 
question of salvation as a personal spiritual 
endeavour, as an intensive anthropological 
transformation (metanoia) may be 
abandoned as irrelevant. One has 
everything which is given in its existential 
concreteness and all this represents an 
unsolvable mystery with which we have to 
live and die. In a certain sense the 
immanent and infinite universe is treated 
as that realised “kingdom” of being in 
which everything is given and one does not 
need to enquire in the facticity of this 
givenness. It is at this point that the 
theological commitment, in 
contradistinction with the spirituality 
without God, aspires and breaks towards 
the transcendent, enquiring into the origins 
of being in the perspective of the human 
life and the sense of its coming into 
existence. Theological commitment revels 
itself as a concern with the sufficient 
conditions of the human existence, 
implying that life is not only a gift of 
existence, but a gift of relationship and 
communion with the eternal. 
 
 Thus the delimiters in free thinking 
of the universe proceed in the long run 
from the freedom of human beings made in 
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the image of God: all thoughts and 
articulations of the universe always contain 
in themselves the traces of the divine 
image. Even when cosmology proves the 
insignificance of humanity in the universe, 
the divine image remains exactly because 
human mind always resists to all attempts 
to circumscribe its life in rubrics of the 
natural, finite and transient. Human beings 
aspire to understand the underlying sense 
of beings and things not according to their 
“nature” (which is unfolded in the 
sciences) but according to the final causes 
of these beings and things in relation to the 
place and goals of humanity in creation.13 
This understanding cannot be explicated 
only through physics and  biology. It is 
based in views on humanity as the crown 
of creation made in the image of God. And 
this is the reason why in a God-like 
fashion humanity wants to recognise all 
sorts of beings (either simple physical 
objects or living organisms) not according 
to their nature  that is according to their 
compelling givenness, but as results of  
humanity’s free will. The image of eternity 
is retained in any cosmological theory 
created through the free willing even if this 
theory predicts the finitude of all actual 
forms of existence and life. Free thinking  
of the universe is thinking of freedom of 
the incarnate human person, brought into 
being in the Divine image by the   will of 
the Holy Spirit.  
 
                                                
13 Humanity, first of all, is not satisfied by that 
vision of its own place in the universe which 
positions it in the same way as “marble is in the 
bag” or a “cat is in the  house”, or “a teacher is in 
the classroom”; “… it is at this point that a kind of 
rebellion takes place: the full reality of the 
individual is surely not exhausted by statistics, and 
the identity of the person demands and appreciation 
of his situation in the world distinct from one’s 
situation in the world.” (Natanson, 1959, p. 233).  
 Thus the proposed methodology of 
studying the relationship between 
cosmology and theology results in  
unfolding of theological motives in 
humanity’s perception of existence in the 
universe, which, on the one hand, outlines 
human beings as its slaves, constantly 
“crushed by the ever increasing mass of 
the astronomical facts”, and which,  on the 
other hand,  manifests the  sense of the 
human life in the universe by elevating it 
beyond the world order through a belief, 
hope and love in the perspective of 
eternity. This dichotomy between the 
infinitely small, finite physical existence 
and the feeling of the light of eternal life 
was felt by the Fathers of the Church and 
great mystical philosophers, as their 
personal vision of the darkness of hell and 
the light of the Spirit to both of which 
human beings are constantly turned and in 
the presence of which they must not only 
continue their life, fighting cosmic 
homelessness and despair, but also fight 
for the finding the sense  of themselves 
and all creation. Theological commitment 
in cosmology is thus a characteristic 
expression  of the visible and invisible 
universe as it appears to man in the 
perspective of communion, that is through 
the eyes and senses enlightened by the 
Divine presence. Whereas numerous books 
on cosmology discuss the role and place of 
humanity in the universe, our research 
brings the universe inside humanity, 
making the universe that mirror of its soul 
which humanity desperately wants to find.   
 
“Theological commitment” as a 
different form of the dialogue between 
theology and science 
 
There is an element of socio-historical 
reality which sheds light on the reasons 
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behind the proposed enquiry into the 
theological commitment in cosmology. 
First of all, cosmology always (in 
particular before its 20th century 
developments) was a part of theism. 
Cosmological arguments for the finitude or 
infinitude of the world in space and time 
were employed as different arguments for 
existence or non-existence of God. Theistic 
inferences are still alive and very popular 
among some philosophers and 
cosmologists who attempt to use 
cosmology in both apologetic and atheistic 
conclusions.14 However, this dimension of 
the debate is not our primary concern, 
because the alternative of existence or non-
existence of God is not an option for this 
research which takes an explicitly  theistic 
stance (that is, theological commitment) on 
the grounds related to the facticity of 
human persons who are subjects of 
cosmological knowledge. Correspondingly 
we do not analyse cosmology from the 
perspective of an explicitly theistic stance 
based on some dogmatic propositions of  
God’s existence, rather we proceed 
cautiously from what we call theological 
commitment as an existential, experiential 
mode of communion with God.  
  
 Secondly, the topic of research is 
related to the dialogue between theology 
and science in general which became a 
matter of scholarly discussions in the last 
20-30 years. The question is: has this 
dialogue, in that form as it has been 
conducted, succeeded so far, that is, did it 
achieve any results which had impact on 
both science and theology? The author 
believes that the negative answer is 
provided by the unceasing scientific and 
                                                
14 The literature on this topic is vast. See a concise 
and eloquent review of recent discussions in 
(Halvorson,  Kragh 2012).  
technological advance (in particular in the 
exact natural sciences) which continues 
with no recourse to the dialogue between 
theology and science whatsoever. All 
discussions on whether science and 
theology are in conflict, or in “peaceful 
coexistence” with each other, do not have 
existential implications: the problem 
remains and its ongoing presence points to 
something which is basic and unavoidable 
in the very human condition.  This net 
result indicates that the method of 
conducting this dialogue at present is 
unsatisfactory in the sense that it does not 
address the major question as to what is 
the underlying foundation in the very 
distinction, difference and division 
between science and religion as those 
modes of activity and knowledge which 
flourish from one and the same human 
subjectivity. But this type of questioning 
makes any scientific insight irrelevant 
simply because science is not capable of 
dealing with the question of its own 
facticity, that is  the facticity of that 
consciousness which is the “pillar and 
ground” of science. Theology can respond 
to this question from within the explicitly 
belief-based ground, namely faith in that 
the knowledge of the world represents 
natural revelation  accessible to humanity 
because of the God-given faculties. 
Knowledge is possible only by human 
persons whose basic qualities are freedom 
and capacity to retain transcendence with 
respect to all they assimilate through life 
and knowledge. In this sense the universe 
as articulated reality has existence and 
sense only in a mode of personhood, which 
is a divine gift. Since science does not 
account for the very possibility of 
knowledge, that is personhood, it is 
automatically prevented from participation 
in the dialogue with theology on equal 
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footing. It is logical then to express a doubt 
on the meaning and value of such an 
existing  “dialogue” with science at all. If 
one insists on this “dialogue” it becomes 
obvious that science and theology cannot 
enter this dialogue as symmetric terms. 
And if there is no impact of this “dialogue” 
on logic and development of science, what 
remains for theology is to exercise an 
introspection upon science, to conduct a 
certain critique   of science from a position 
which is, by definition, above and beyond 
not only scientific thinking, but secular 
thinking in general related to particular 
socio-historical and economic realities.  
Thus  symmetry between theology and 
science, theology and cosmology in 
particular, is broken from the very 
inception. It is this asymmetry that 
constitutes that approach to the science-
religion discussions which we describe in 
terms of theological commitment.  
Theological commitment is such a stance 
on human being which always positions it 
above and beyond those realities which are 
disclosed by science alone. It appeals to 
those meanings of existence which do not 
compel  the recognition of the science in 
the manner that natural phenomena do. 
These meanings originate in an innate 
quality of human beings to long for 
immortality, that is communion with the 
unconditional personal ground of the 
whole world, which humanity names God. 
And it is through this longing that the 
universe acquires a certain sense  as that 
constituent of God’s creation which makes 
it possible for human persons to fulfil 
God’s promise for eternal life and 
communion.  Theological commitment is 
thus existential commitment. 
 
 Thirdly, theological commitment is 
the reaction to modern atheism. Indeed, in 
its goals and tasks the dialogue between 
Christianity and science is to oppose 
atheism. However, if one carefully looks at 
how this dialogue has been conducted so 
far, one easily realises that the existing 
forms of this dialogue are adapted to that 
which is imposed by atheism. Such a 
dialogue turns out to be no more than a 
reaction to atheism, sometimes attempting 
to unconvincingly justify the very fact of 
this reaction. Contemporary atheism 
manifests itself not only as freedom from 
historical  authorities and tradition (that is 
the liberation from freedom in  a Christian 
sense) and not only as the unprincipled 
following of the proclamation “enjoy life 
for there is no God”, that is not only as the 
worst form of the unenlightened  slavery of 
the Plato’s cave in which the signs of the 
Divine presence are not recognised and the 
very ability to see them in the world is 
reduced to nothing. Atheism promotes a 
cult of immanence, the actually existent 
infinity of the given15, appealing de facto 
to deprivation of the senses and the vision 
of the transcendent (and hence to the 
relaxation of a soteriological moment). 
Since modern science, and technology in 
particular, encourage individuals to be 
transcendent-blind, creating the immanent 
images of the transcendent, the advocates 
of atheism appeal to science. By so doing 
atheism adjusts to the demands and moods 
of modern time. It is much easier not to 
deny the presence of the Divine in the 
world, but to claim that all spheres of the 
human activity are self-sufficient and do 
not need any reference to God. Since from 
a philosophical point of view the question 
of God’s existence or nonexistence cannot 
be decided at all (the philosophical mind 
                                                
15 See a more elaborate formulation of a mysticism 
of immanence, for example, in (Comte-Sponville 
2006, pp. 145-212.  
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remains in the “negative certitude” with 
respect to this question), then why should 
one try to answer it. Would it not be easier 
to recognise that science, art, literature etc. 
are just given in rubrics of that which is 
unconcealed to humanity. Here atheism 
reveals itself as secularism, as a kind of 
trans-ideological läicité , as a servility to 
nobody’s interests, and as a servility to the 
alleged ideal of humanity understood only 
empirically, as that humanity which is 
alive here and now16 (it is supposed that 
this ideal of humanity has in itself a 
universal criterion of its own definition). 
To define  this humanity in simple 
categories which overcome racial national 
and class differences one needs a universal 
language. It is science which pretends to be 
such a language; to be   more precise, it is 
that scientific form of thinking which 
reduces the phenomenon of humanity in all 
its various manifestations to the physical 
and biological.  It is clear from here that 
modern atheism as a certain form of the 
“immanent humanism”  is no more than a 
scientific atheism. However this atheism 
positions itself as more aggressive17 and 
sinister, more advanced philosophically 
and anti-theologically18 than was the case 
in the Soviet Russia. The reason for this is 
that modern atheism is ultimately 
motivated  by the logic of material 
production and human resources, that is by 
the needs of the developing economies and 
not an abstract ideology.19  
                                                
16 As was  argued by G. Goutner, the alleged ideal 
of humanity, understood, for example as it unity, 
simply does not exist. One can think of it only in a 
modality of hope which has a religious nature 
(Goutner 2013).  
17 See examples of this in, for example, (Dawkins 
2007), and  (Stenger 2008). 
18 See, for example (Comte-Sponville 2006). 
19 This point was emphatically defended by C. 
Yannaras in his article “The Church in Post-
Communist Europe”, (Yannaras1 2011). 
 
 The freedom from traditional and 
philosophical authorities as well as 
historical values inverts in modern atheism 
towards slavery to the scientifically 
articulated and verified. It is paradoxical, 
and fundamentally different from the 
Soviet model of atheism, that a slogan that 
“knowledge is power” is not appreciated in 
the economically advanced societies, for  
the all-encompassing knowledge, that is 
knowing too much, is potentially socially 
dangerous. This entails in turn that 
knowledge and science both function in 
society in a reduced and popular form 
which does not allow one to judge of its 
certitude, quality  and completeness. 
Scientific knowledge becomes a world-
outlook, ideology and a filter of the social 
loyalty and adequacy. As a result the abuse 
of science becomes a norm which creates 
an illusion of its efficiency and truth in all 
spheres of life. The scientific method is 
treated as self-sufficient and not being in 
need of any justification and evaluation. 
Science proclaims the truth of the world 
from its own rationality which functions in 
the disincarnate collective consciousness. 
Supported through the system of grants 
from the economically powerful group, it 
is allegedly done for the sake of human 
good. However by functioning in society 
science forgets about that simple truth that 
science is the human creation and its initial 
meaning was to guard the interests of 
people and not to make them slaves and 
hostages of the scientific method. 
 
 The situation with the dominance 
of the scientific approach to all aspects of 
life becomes even more paradoxical when 
one realises that human beings do not 
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become more happy and free   from the 
aspects of material existence. They cannot 
escape social injustice, hardship of 
mundane life, diseases and moral losses. 
This happens because science as an 
ideology does not spell out what is most 
important, namely that it does not know the 
goals and ways of its future development. 
In its grandeur science has to intentionally 
disregard those aspects of reality which are 
not described by it or which behave 
sporadically and unpredictably with 
respect to scientific prognosis.  Economic 
growth and welfare of the developed 
nations which used to live in comfortable 
conditions, the cult of consumption and 
greed demand more technological 
development related to the exploitation of 
the natural resources. Every new discovery 
in physics is employed for the optimisation 
of the production of goods and energy, so 
that one can speak about merciless 
exploitation of the physical reality in 
general. It is very seldom that the question 
of the legitimacy and justification of such 
an exploitation, or, as some say, “rape of 
nature”20 is even thought of. By making 
nature an object of manipulation scientific 
consciousness forgets of its humanitarian 
duties in respect to nature: nature must be 
“respected” simply because we live in it  
and that there is the light of that all-
embracing reason (Logos) which we, 
human beings, carry in ourselves as little 
logoi. The  objects of nature are 
inseparable from their creator, so that the 
                                                
20 This was the title of Ph. Sherrard’s book The 
Rape of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the 
Origins and Consequences of Modern Science 
(Sherrard 1991), where he aggressively criticised 
modern science for the exaggeration of the sphere 
of applicability of its methods and resulting 
dehumanisation of humanity and desanctification of 
nature.  
 
oblivion of this fact leads to the loss of 
love of them in the same sense  as the loss 
of love to other people. A careful insight of 
a philosopher or a theologian will 
unmistakenly identify the root of the 
problem, namely that the atomisation, and 
disassemblement of the physical reality in 
course of its exploitation has it origin in 
the ethical individualism of those who 
know this reality, that is the loss of love to 
nature in the scientific community. The 
individualism consists in that the 
exploration and acquisition of physical 
reality becomes an affair of that human 
spirit which is divided in   its narrow 
professional and corporative interests in 
which the element of catholicity with 
nature through the divine-given existence, 
is forgotten because love does not rule 
anymore for the interest of knowledge and 
longing for the perpetual good.  
 
 The ambitions of the immanent 
secular reason, supported by the scientific 
achievements  seem to be even more 
strange if one realises that modern science, 
in spite of its successes manifests the 
symptoms of a deep crisis related to the 
uncertainty of its goals. Scientific activity 
is purposive to the extent which 
accompanies any human activity. Any 
particular research has a concrete objective 
either to satisfy a practical interest or 
simply curiosity. However when we speak 
of the uncertainty of goals of science in 
general, we mean something different: 
scientific quest is spontaneous and is not 
related to the spiritual, infinite tasks of 
humanity. The practical purposiveness of 
scientific research thus unfolds only a 
particular sector of nature so that there 
remains a gap between that which has been 
known through a scientific 
phenomenalisation and that which cannot 
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be known by science at all.  This fact 
manifests that nature has a propensity to 
remain concealed and react with respect to 
human experiments unpredictably. As an 
example, one can point to nuclear physics 
which, by acquiring the mysteries of the  
microworld and risks creating a state of 
matter which can threaten human existence 
on this planet.21 There is a danger in 
nuclear experiments of trespassing the 
boundary of the unconcealed, related to 
human existence, when constructed 
devices and artificial states of matter may 
behave in a non-human way, contradicting 
the initial objectives of experiments and 
turning science against humanity. A simple 
example from philosophical discussions of 
the 1950s is the atomic bomb which 
brought humanity to a new situation when 
the conditions of its existence are not 
controlled anymore only by the natural 
processes, but depend on the good will of 
people making decisions of using or not 
nuclear weapons, thus influencing   global 
natural processes.22 Another example is the 
ecological crisis. The melting polar cup of 
Greenland, extinction of some animal 
species and forthcoming migration of 
peoples living in the Arctic region show 
that technological applications of science 
escaping moral reason lead to problem of 
the social and political order. Science 
through technology is not neutral anymore 
to economics and politics and, on the 
contrary, becomes their result and prophet. 
                                                
21 For futurological accounts based on the threats 
originating in modern science see books of (Leslie 
1996), and 
(Rees 2003). 
22 N. A. Berdyaev prophetically argued in the 1930s 
that humanity enters a new era when the stability of 
the world will depend on moral decisions of 
humanity of how to use technology available 
through scientific advance. See his  paper 
(Berdyaev 1991). 
 
The process of exploration and knowledge 
of the surrounding world and thus its 
“transformation” becomes involved into 
the sphere of interests of the world’s 
powers and classes so that its ethical 
significance is determined by its belonging 
to this or that social-economic demand. 
That which has been said entails that 
scientific knowledge and the very idea that 
society can and must develop only on the 
basis of scientific progress becomes an 
ideological dogma, the following and 
defending of which in turn becomes a 
matter of social loyalty. However, without 
understanding its logic and definite goals, 
scientific progress, being de facto 
unavoidable  and irreversible, carries in 
itself a potential danger because of the 
unpredictable nature of it applications.  
Human beings want to live better and 
longer; however this natural desire does 
not supply a clear understanding of the 
goals of science, whereas humanity 
becomes more and more dependent on its 
achievements and applications. 
 
 The fact that scientific advance 
leaves huge realms of being unexplored 
and unknown becomes even more evident 
in theoretical sciences, in particular in 
cosmology. On the one hand cosmology 
provides us with a comprehensive theory 
of the universe supported by observations. 
On the other hand it has to admit that those 
forms of matter in the universe which are 
physically understood constitute only 4 
percent of its material content (the 
remaining  96 percent associated with the 
so called dark mass and dark energy 
remain by now beyond the reach of 
experiments; their existence is a matter of 
theoretical conviction).  The more 
cosmology refines its scenario of the 
universe’s evolution, the more it realises 
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the abyss of the physically unknown. 
Speaking philosophically, cosmology 
makes clearly seen the boundaries of the 
unconcealed which is related to humanity: 
it is only 4 percent of mater in the universe 
which can be said to be consubstantial to 
human physical and biological form. 
Amazingly, however, that in spite of all 
evidence for the limited nature of our 
knowledge of the universe, cosmologists 
sometimes position themselves as 
“prophets and priests” of the universe, 
preaching of it as if they know the absolute 
truth of the world. Such a conviction with 
respect to knowledge of the universe 
originates in a naïve representation of the 
universe as a whole as an “object” whose 
phenomenality can be exhausted through 
the logic of scientific signifiers.  
 
 One of the major attributes of 
modern science which makes it powerful is 
its radical mathematization of nature. 
Physics and cosmology, through 
mathematical models and theories, 
predicate realities inaccessible in direct 
experiments. There is a paradoxical shift of 
representations of reality here: 
unobservable intelligible entities are 
treated as more  fundamental  and 
responsible for the contingent display of 
visible nature. As we argued elsewhere 
mathematisation of nature is accompanied 
by the diminution of humanity, in 
particular the personal dimension of 
existence (see Nesteruk 2008, pp. 188-
205). Person disappears from scientific 
discourse in spite of the fact that all 
articulated facts are made by persons. 
Science is being effected in the name of 
human persons, but this same person turns 
out to be outside  of scientific description. 
Persons are needed for the anonymous 
objectives of science to disclose reality, 
but they do not exist for science as 
agencies of other non-scientific truths and 
individual lives. Science as a social 
process needs scientific workers but not 
persons as unique and unrepeatable events 
of disclosure of the universe. The same is 
true with respect to society which needs 
not persons but masses of individuals 
which are much easier adapted to the 
norms of materialistic  thinking  and 
behaviourist stereotypes based in the 
criteria of consumption of the results of 
technological progress. Modern atheism 
exploits this aspect of modern science by 
insisting on effective non-existence of 
personhood as a philosophical and 
theological notion. The oblivion of the 
person is treated by Christian theology as 
an encroachment on the absolute priority 
of the human world and those communal 
links in human societies which have 
formed the spirit of the Christian 
civilisation and integrity of its historical 
paths through communion with God. The 
oblivion of the person is the encroachment 
on the historical significance of  its history 
impressed in the architectural image of 
European cities, masterpieces of art and 
literature, in the very way of European 
thinking and its values. The oblivion of the 
person constitutes an attack on all 
traditional forms of societies and life, 
which by the logic of the economical must 
cease to exist or become unobservable.  
   
 
 To defend the person and to 
reinstate it to its central status in the 
dialogue between theology and cosmology 
becomes a leading motive of the 
theological commitment. To reinstate the 
person means to understand that the 
problem of theology and science manifests 
the basic distinction and division of two 
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attitudes to life in one and the same human 
person.  The dialogue between theology 
and science becomes the explication the 
split between intentionalities which the 
human spirit attempts to reconcile. This , 
by using the language of Husserl, forms 
one of the infinite tasks of the human spirit 
to understand the meaning of existence. 
The very fact that this dialogue exists 
attests that human beings transcend the 
conditions of their physic-biological 
existence, the self-realisation of a special 
place in the universe in which the function 
of the Divine image in man is realised 
(Berdyaev1944, p. 94). Thus  the fact of 
the dialogue attests also to that it contains 
the elements of transcendence and 
asymmetry between theology and science 
related to the human condition which is 
called personhood. It is this asymmetry, 
articulated in reflection, which we call the 
theological commitment, by confirming 
once again that this is an existential 
commitment. Correspondingly it seems 
doubtful that the dialogue between 
Christian theology and cosmology is 
possible without faith that both theology 
and cosmology represent modalities of the 
relationship between humanity and the 
Divine.    
 
Theological commitment as a form of  
critique of secular science 
 
Contemporary science is historically 
rooted in the so called modernity 
(sometime historically associated with the 
fall of Constantinople in 1453) which has 
been responsible for dualisms such as the 
opposition between faith and reason, the 
dualisms which formed the grounds for 
excluding the divine and transcendent. It is 
modernity which is responsible for the 
claim that truth is based on universal 
reason, which tells us what reality is like. 
In this historical setting theology (as a way 
of life) was forced in the dialogue with 
science following the rules of modernity 
but not its own intrinsic logic of 
communion with God. These rules 
effectively dictated that theology entered 
the dialogue between faith and reason 
along the lines of adopted secular 
standards of scientific truth or normative 
rationality assuming a particular notion of 
the knowing subject (as impersonal and 
disembodied collective subjectivity) which 
is sharply opposed to the theological way 
of asserting truth through events of 
incarnate hypostatic lives. Seen 
theologically the secular standards of 
affirming truth are themselves based in 
certain myths and beliefs (for example in 
the existence of a universal human reason) 
so that they can affirm objective values 
only precariously. One of the dimensions 
of the modern dialogue between science 
and theology is exactly to put modernity’s 
claim for the universality of truth under 
question (at least in what concerns the 
human sciences, including philosophy and 
theology), asserting that the modernity’s 
ways of appropriation of truth were in a 
certain deviation from the unified vision of 
the world which was based in the 
characteristic alliance between faith and 
knowledge both originating in communion 
with God.    
 
 Modernity can be characterised as a 
change in the very way of questioning of 
God. According to the Christian biblical 
thinking the question never was formulated 
as “Whether I must believe in God?” and 
hence “Does God exist?” For  a Christian 
the main question was a biblical one: 
“Who is that God whom I must trust?” 
There is a fundamental difference between 
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belief in existence of God and trust to God. 
The God of the Bible requires from one 
much more than a recognition on the level 
of fact or theory of its existence.  It 
demands from us “existential 
commitment” and entrusting our lives in 
God’s care. This does not mean a lack of a 
rational element in such understanding of 
faith and trust. In early Christianity one 
can meet rational arguments in favour of 
the existence of God. It is enough to 
mention St. Athanasius of Alexandria, who 
pointed out that one can deduce the 
existence of God from observing the order 
and harmony in the world.23  One must 
remember, however, that these arguments 
were aimed at Christians, that is to those 
who believed in God in order to reveal a 
rational element within Christian faith.24 
Rationality in faith aids one in elucidating 
the sense of this faith as faith in God, but 
not as belief in happiness and pleasures of 
life, for example. Correspondingly 
knowledge as such does not lead us 
immediately to knowledge of the Divine, 
for the Divine participation in us is not an 
object of  direct “observation” or intuition, 
but is revealed only through a rational 
reflection.25 
 
 It is probably only starting from 
Descartes in the 17th century that 
arguments on the existence of  God 
                                                
23 Athanasius of Alexandria, Contra gentes, 35:4 
[ET: Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, series 2, vol. 
4]. 
24 Clement of Alexandria, The Stromatata, or 
Miscellanies, Book I, Ch. 5 [ET: Ante Nicene 
Fathers, vol. 2]. 
25 The importance of the rational faith, as the faith 
reflected and elucidated by reason, was accentuated 
by Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologia, 1a,2,1) in 
his polemics with St. John of Damascus (Orthodox 
Faith, 1,3), according to whom faith in God is an 
innate quality. (See discussion of this issue in 
(Coplestone1950, pp. 336-37.) 
become to be used in order to convince 
sceptics that God indeed exists. The 
intellectuals in Western Europe started to 
follow a view that religious beliefs are 
based first of all in rational convictions. 
This view corresponded to the rise of 
knowledge rooted in empirical justification 
and “scientific method.” The arguments 
for the existence of God, beginning from 
the times of modernity, based on the logic 
of scientific demonstration, became the 
only legitimate foundation for faith in God 
at all. Divine revelation and personal 
experience were not considered anymore 
as a responsible judgement. The witness of 
the Scriptures was accepted only after the 
rationality of such an evidence was 
established through other independent 
methods. One can notice here how an 
increasing wave of secular thinking 
detached from faith began to impose its 
standards in the realm of faith. Secularism 
meant not simply that in arguments related 
to faith one must use reason, but that this 
reason is independent from faith and  
immanent to logic and laws of this world, 
being thus the only  measure of all human 
activity, so that faith in God and religious 
experience acquired any sense only from 
within this reason.  
 
 By criticising faith for its 
unconvincing arguments and accusing it of 
being subjective and related to the 
overcoming of existential anxieties, 
“modernity” with its scientific method falls 
into another extreme: by assigning to  
reason disembodied universality, the 
discourse of humanity is thus being thrown 
away from the sphere of reason. Science  
becomes such a world-outlook which deals 
not with concrete human beings (with their 
immediate concerns, history and life), but 
as an indefinite and abstract, anonymous 
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and non-empirical structure in being which 
“controls” every particular embodied 
creature. Nobody argues against the 
efficiency and importance of science in 
modern world, but it must be remembered 
that the adoption of the scientific method, 
in fact, manifests a certain belief in 
efficiency and existential importance of the 
anonymous and disincarnate way of 
knowledge in opposition to other forms of 
experience and views of the sense of the 
human.  By decentring the cosmos, that is 
removing it from the sphere of the personal 
standing “in front of”  (as an aesthetical 
category) and making it an extensional 
arena of  blind physical forces (that is 
making it an object),  human beings make 
a preference for a different mythology 
whose existential meaning is reduced to a 
simple desire to doom itself in the 
meaningless and contingent non-
purposiveness in the universe, that is to be 
dissolved in the “cosmic homelessness”. It 
is this decentring of the cosmos which is 
disclosed from within the theological 
commitment as based in a philosophical 
belief in the very possibility of such a 
decentring.  Since this philosophical belief 
is not demonstrable from the ways of 
science itself, its very application remains 
no more than an empirical and contingent 
fact which points toward the contingent 
facticity of that world-picture  which is 
built upon it. Correspondingly all 
judgements of the scientific method on the 
possibility or impossibility of making 
inference  on the trans-worldly foundation 
of the universe remain only precarious.    
 
 Modernity’s stance on knowledge 
is seen as a certain deviation from the 
unified and spiritually universal approach 
to knowing reality which existed in late 
antiquity and Middle ages. Science or, 
more precisely knowledge (episteme), 
received its interpretation by theology 
which elucidated the sense of knowledge 
and the foundations of its contingent 
facticity. Knowledge understood by 
modernity excluded communion, that is 
the living participation and ontological 
relation  with that which is being known 
(this relation, by using the language of 
Heidegger, one could interpret, on the one 
hand, as letting human essence be 
controlled by the circle of the unconcealed, 
and, on the other hand, for human beings 
to be able to remain concealed in relation 
to this circle, retaining its hypostatic, 
irreducible to nature qualities).  
Correspondingly the truth of such 
knowledge was limited to individual 
comprehension and to the correspondence 
of thought to its object (veritas est 
adaequatio rei et intellectus). Ratio, 
understood as a reduced and transformed 
version of logos of Greek Patristics, 
corresponded to the transition from the 
epistemic priority of communion to the 
priority of the individualised rational 
concept. The subject of logic and 
knowledge of modernity acquired a new 
qualitative feature of being able to wander 
at large over  reality without being aware 
of its own fundamental otherness with 
respect to it, that otherness  which, 
nevertheless, allows one to enter relation 
with reality  and interpret it as words 
imbued with energy (logoi). The distortion 
of the sense of logos, understood as 
knowledge through communion lies in the 
foundation of all standards of thought 
which ultimately originated in Scholastics 
(and later in Descartes) and that was a 
considerable deviation from Christian 
theology of the late antiquity and Middle 
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ages.26   The change of view on knowledge 
as originating not in  a hypostasis but in an 
individual was a certain distortion of   
anthropology in favour of psychological 
individualism and also the evaluation of a 
human subject on the basis of the juridical 
criteria.27 As a result, the understanding of 
objectivity, corresponding to this change, 
as being devoid of the living communion 
and based on the realities of the law-like 
order, led to the formation of the scientific 
and technical civilisation and methods of 
knowledge rooted in utilitarian principles 
related to the social rights and goals.  
 
 Whereas Western theology had to 
adapt to the demands of modernity and 
hence accept secular norms in its 
arguments on the presence of the Divine in 
the world and it interaction with the 
sciences, the theology of the Eastern 
Church retained “pre-modern” experience 
                                                
26 The problem of changing views on the role of  
subject and the sense of knowledge in history of 
philosophy (regardless to the Christian context) was 
carefully traced by Heidegger in his book on 
Nietzsche  (Heidegger, 1997). Contraposing 
modernity to medieval scholastics (which he links 
to knowledge “associated with the order of 
salvation”), Heidegger points out that “man, 
independently and by his own effort, contrives to 
become certain and sure of his human being in the 
midst of beings as a whole” (p. 89). According to 
Heidegger, the major task is search for the ways of 
such assurance, a method, which inevitably   lead to 
the Cartesian formulation “Cogito ergo sum”. 
However, the proclamation of this thesis does not 
liberate the theologically committed ego from 
asking a question  about the foundation of the very 
contingent facticity of cogito. This, as the Fathers 
of the Church asserted was not a question of 
knowledge as such, but the question about the logos 
of this knowledge.  
27 Nowadays such a distortion of anthropology 
leads to the formation and cultivation of a type of 
person whose ability to function in the conditions 
of dynamical communion is in a state of decline. 
This concerns first of all with the limited freedom 
of speech, independent thinking and judgement, in 
the conditions when the ability to imagination and  
even more, volition, are essentially supressed.     
of seeing sciences and knowledge without 
adapting to the secularism of modernity.  It 
is because of this that Christian theology, 
in particular in its Eastern Orthodox form, 
being faithful to the tradition of life in 
communion with God dogmatically and 
liturgically, thus transcending all historical 
divisions, feels empowered to question the 
foundational premises of modern science 
and the ways how its dialogue with 
theology is organised.28 Since modernity is 
seen by the Eastern Orthodox as a certain 
deviation from the view that any 
knowledge contains a deposit of faith (let it 
be simple existential faith), Christian 
theology is given the right to use the 
language and critical methods developed 
within modern and postmodern 
philosophy, and other human sciences, in 
order to explicate those “faith-like 
commitments” which underlie modern 
science with its claims for truth and hence 
the imposed form of its dialogue with 
theology. If scientific claims for truth will 
be seen as endowed with the certainty of 
belief, the dialogue between theology and 
science will rise to a different level, 
namely that the distinction and difference 
between theology and science will be seen 
as the differentiation of intentionalities and 
constituents of one and the same human 
subjectivity. In this the dialogue between 
theology and science will acquire features 
of a phenomenological project where 
phenomenology is employed as a 
                                                
28 This is a particular dimension of a possible 
response to the question posed by A. Walker more 
than twenty years ago: “Given that modernism by 
definition wants to scrutinise and criticise all 
traditional ways of thinking and expression-and 
modernism is no respect of confessions, for all 
historic and traditional commitments are grist to its 
critical mill – is there any way we can critically 
evaluate modernist thought from the perspective of 
historic Christianity?” (Walker 1988,  p.  4). 
 26 
particular method in exercising a critical 
function of  theological commitment. In 
different words, the discourse seen through 
the theological commitment cannot avoid 
phenomenology as a method of explication 
of this commitment.  
 
 The appearance of phenomenology 
in a theological discourse shows once 
again that theology in the mode of 
operation by reason is a form of critical 
thinking, because phenomenology is itself  
a mode of operation of critical thinking. 
The sphere of operation of theological 
critical thinking is in all realms where the 
Church (ecclesial humanity) meets  
historical and cultural reality. Theology 
creatively and critically thinks of any 
emerging historical problem or  scientific 
theme, while remaining in the immutable 
state of the Church’s spiritual life, because 
this life is experience of God, that is, of 
eternity.29  Thus theology always functions 
from above mass-religious consciousness, 
as well  as “secular” scientific 
consciousness which claims its freedom 
from any faith commitments; theology’s 
unceasing task is to provide a constant and 
constructive critique of these modes of 
consciousness by referring them to the 
original divine image in humanity.  
 
                                                
29 In words of D. Staniloae: “The very existence of 
the Church is an effect, continually renewed of the 
action of the Holy Spirit in creating communion” 
(Staniloae 1980, p. 218)  “The door of the infinite 
riches of the personal or interpersonal divine being 
has opened up before the reflections of Orthodox  
theology, and with it the prospects of an endless 
progress of the human spirit within the divine” 
(Ibid.) “The paradox of the Church mission in “this 
world” is just in that the power of the ecclesial 
influence of the world directly  depends on the 
ability of the Church to be “bigger than the word”, 
to transcend the world and to see it through the 
“Divine vision””. (Filaret 2004, p. 53). 
 In doing the above critique 
theology asserts itself as a meta-discourse, 
that is, as that form of critical thinking 
about different modalities of social 
activity, including a scientific one, which 
expresses the Divine presence and action, 
and which is not being bounded or 
exploited by some other particular  human 
activities as their  “prophetic” voice, be it 
the socio-historical sciences or a kind of 
all-encompassing transcendental 
philosophy. The critical function of 
theology with respect to other discourses 
never allows theology to slip into  such a 
position that its scope and place will be 
determined by other discourses, for 
example by the science-religion dialogue 
as such.   In this sense theology can never 
be defined and positioned by  secular 
reason and thus it does not accept the idea 
of a complete autonomy of that sphere of 
the worldly reality which is asserted 
through rational, that is scientific, 
understanding.30  
 
 One must take into account that by 
promoting theology to be a critical 
thinking we imply that this theology is in 
ecclesial setting,  that is its inseparability 
from experience of God through historical 
tradition, liturgy and other forms of  
communion. This entails that by being 
critical with respect to various forms of 
thought theology represents the voice of 
the Church as that “place” in the universe 
where God meets humanity. This implies 
in turn that in order to remain critical and 
encompassing with respect to other 
discourses, the Church must remain 
independent in its voice and not to be 
                                                
30 As it is emphatically advocated by J. L. Marion, 
theology deals with the saturated phenomena, 
whose phenomenality cannot be embraced by 
means of  scientific analysis.  
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easily adapted to the requirements of the 
secular reason, and, in particular, to the 
demands of the dialogue with  science.31 If 
this were not to be the case and secular 
reason uncritically claimed its right for 
neutrality, objectivity and independence 
from any faith commitments, faith and 
reason would remain parallel and non-
intersecting in this age.32  But the 
separation of faith and reason is the 
consequence of many other divisions in 
one and the same subjectivity, and this 
separation in turn divides, in this 
subjectivity, the Divine and the created. It 
is this very division (Gr. diairesis),  which 
St. Maximus the Confessor described as 
the moral tension between the Creator and 
the created, and whose alleviation is the 
ultimate goal of the human 
accomplishment of the Divine likeness.33 
If the tension between faith and reason is 
sought to be overcome, it is clear that it 
can be done only within a strong faith-
commitment, and secular reason alone is 
incapable of attempting this mediation in a 
non-totalitarian and non-reductive way. 
                                                
31 This makes Christian theology flexible to any 
scientific developments without being assimilated 
by them. According to V. Lossky, Christian 
theology “..is able to accommodate  itself very 
easily to any scientific theory of the universe, 
provided that this does not attempt to go beyond its 
own boundaries and begins impertinently to deny 
things which are outside its own field of vision” 
(Lossky 1957, p. 106). This accommodation means 
to remain critical to all scientific claims for 
monopoly of truth, that is to remain “meta-
discourse”.  
32 This thought was discussed by J. Shakhovskoi in 
the context of the views of the physicist  Max 
Planck on science and religion. Planck (Planck 
1938)) compared the growth of scientific 
knowledge and of religious experience with two 
parallel lines. They have a common point of 
intersection, infinitely distant from ourselves, that 
is, distant from the present age and being in the age 
to come (Shakhovskoi 2003, p. 15).  
33 See in this respect: (Thunberg 1995), (Larchet 
1996). 
However, if theology submits itself to the 
logic of the secular (for example, assuming 
a scientific form) it would become one 
particular, although very special, mode of 
activity separated from other modalities of 
human reality which do not fit in the 
rubrics of secular demands.34 As an 
example, following the logic of the 
secular, theology has to deal with the issue 
of biological evolution and origin of 
humanity which, in the perspective of 
science, accentuates the physical and 
biological, that is corporeal and hence 
collective. But no theory of evolution can 
literally say anything about the origin of 
hypostatic human subjectivity, that is of 
persons who articulate this same evolution 
as such. It is persons who have empathy 
and love, who can rejoice  and suffer, but 
whose account is impossible in science.  
Theology, in contradistinction with 
science, is an existential enterprise never 
abstracting from the concreteness of the 
human person and its desire to attain 
immortality. Theology as experience of 
communion with the invisible origin of all 
is life, so that it encompasses all reality in 
which humanity is present not only 
physically (through the senses and 
discursive cognitive faculties), but through 
insight (Kant would say judgement); thus it 
is intrinsically present in all disclosures 
and manifestations of reality  by human 
beings, so that all reality’s articulations are 
referred to and judged by the theological 
modality of life. 
 
 The theological commitment in the 
dialogue with science means the radical 
stance on science following from the 
                                                
34 Such a “secular” theology, for example,  would 
not be able to take into account liturgical rites, 
communities and communion as an indispensable 
component of experience of the Divine. 
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objective requirement that ecclesial 
theology must draw a clear borderline 
between the dispassionate contemplation 
of what happens in modern science and its 
involvement in it.35 The criteria of 
delimiters can be set in words of Jesus 
Christ: “What does anyone gain by 
winning the whole world at the cost of 
destroying himself?”(Lk. 9:25; Cf. Matt. 
16:26). In modern terms it would sound 
like this: “What does humankind gain by 
exploring and subjecting the world to its 
curiosity and utilitarian needs at the cost of 
loosing the sense of integrity of existence 
and the vision of humanity’s infinite tasks 
and spiritual goals as linked to the 
transcendent?”  Theology must not, it has 
no right to be involved in those movements 
of a new nihilistic spirit originating, in 
fact, from the modern  apology for atheism 
which dare address to modern men the 
questions like this: What is the point of the 
humanity of humans, the naturalness of 
nature, the justice of the polis, and the 
truth of knowledge? Why not rather their 
opposites, the dehumanization of humans 
to improve humanity, the systematic  
raping of nature to develop the economy, 
injustice to keep society more efficient, the 
vast ocean of distracting and existentially 
irrelevant information to escape the 
commitment to truth? Since these counter-
possibilities are no longer just a 
hypothetical speculation but nearly the sole 
program of the ideologies that have 
dominated in history since the beginning 
of the 20th century, the Church and  all 
those  for whom the humanity of humans, 
the naturalness of nature, the justice of the 
polis, and the truth of knowledge remain 
absolute values, must have a decisive and 
                                                
35 In a general context this implies the possibility of 
the critical evaluation of modernist thought from 
the perspective of historic Christianity.  
radical response to it by conducting the 
systematic critique of those forms of 
secular (and scientifically based) thinking 
which encourages mass-consciousness  to  
the “winning” the autonomous scientific  
part of the world at the cost of destroying 
communion with the whole. However, its 
theological radical critique of the 
scientifically asserted world does not 
preclude this same theology from being 
radically positive with respect to science 
and the world. What Orthodox  theology 
judges is the alleged autonomy and 
independence of the scientific view of the 
world from the very intricate inherence in 
the human and hence in the Divine (c.f. 
Nellas, 1997, pp. 93-104). The positive 
judgement of science and the world 
originates from the sanctification which 
existential ecclesial theology undertakes by 
bringing all fruits of human labour, 
including science and its picture of the 
world,  to the their correct operation in the  
wholeness of communion.  
 
 Here not only a dispassionate 
critique of a scientific secular mode of 
thinking is implied. The Christian 
imperative calls into question the ethical 
value of the pure secular science with its 
pretence to objectivity and neutrality and 
its claim for the truth of being, as if it is 
devoid of any faith assumptions and 
possibility of transcendence. It calls into 
question some gnostic ambitions of 
modern science  to be the power which 
helps people to solve problems of physical 
survival. In these pretensions modern 
science denies not only theology’s right to 
predicate reality, but it denies also 
philosophy  (as love of wisdom) for the 
uncertainty of its judgements (certitudes 
négatives). The scientific secular mind 
aspires not to philosophy, but to gnosis, 
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that is, precise and demonstrable 
knowledge. Its aim is to justify the thesis 
that one must keep silent about that which 
cannot be spoken in terms of the rubrics of 
reason. Theological commitment advocates 
the opposite in a sophisticated, apophatic, 
sense: one has no right to keep silent about 
things of which we cannot speak (using 
pure reason), for in this case we pass over 
in silence the essence of our existence. Yet 
one can talk about ultimate existential 
things only through metaphors and 
aberrations in being clear that the fullness 
of essential questions cannot be exhausted 
by the faculties of reason.    When the 
precision of judgement becomes an 
absolute value so that all questions beyond 
this “precise gnosis” are abandoned, 
human being feels lost and deprived  of its 
own existential anxieties. In this sense 
faith implied in the theological 
commitment never threatens science and 
philosophy: on the contrary it protects 
them  from the all-pervasive pretensions of 
gnosis (and, as a result, from atheism and 
soul-corroding nihilism) (c.f. Ratzinger 
1993, s. 40). Theology based in faith, 
being all inclusive, needs  both philosophy 
and science because faith operates in the 
conditions of the incarnate humanity which 
seeks and asks for truth. Faith has its duty 
with respect to reason36 but it still  remains 
                                                
36 One implies here the duty of faith with respect to 
philosophy. Christian teaching on the Incarnation, 
in order to reveal God in its humanity, appeals to a 
new and superior reason which pertains to human 
reason. Christians do not have choice in possessing 
the “kind of reason”, that is logos, because they 
bear name of That one Who is the Logos Himself. 
This is the reason why Christians had to acquire the 
achievements of Greek philosophy and sciences 
(one may recall Clement of Alexandria who argued 
in favour if this). St. Augustine asserted that 
Christianity cannot be compared with ancient 
religions (theologia civilis and theologia fabulosa- 
political theology and mythological theology), with 
the only exception  theologia naturalis (natural 
critical with respect to both philosophy and 
science.  
 
 There must be, however, made a 
comment on the sense of our usage of the 
word “critique” if it applied by theology 
with respect to secular thinking, including 
science. In fact, there must be made a 
distinction between our sense of “critique” 
and atheistic criticism of theology based 
on the grounds of the so called “critical 
rationalism”. Briefly, the essence of this  
philosophical trend descending from K. 
Popper, and being first of all represented  
by H. Albert37,  consists in appeal to 
constant understanding and revaluation of 
the achieved landmarks of knowledge, 
revising and amending all empirical results 
as well as intellectual constructs. This 
strategy of research and seeking for truth is 
treated as to be genuinely  rational. 
Correspondingly the attitude of the 
atheistically oriented representatives of this 
“critical rationalism” is to criticise religion, 
and Christianity in particular, for being 
dogmatic and using the “ strategy of 
                                                                    
theology), that is with an attempt of rational 
knowledge of God through studying celestial 
movements. Augustine insists that the term 
theologia, for Christian faith, must be understood 
only as true knowledge of the Divine. Since the 
notion of truth is employed, “…comparison must 
be made with philosophy”; thus faith becomes, first 
of all the subject of philosophy because as 
Augustine affirms  “the true philosopher is the 
lover of God” (Augustine 1980, p. 298). In spite of 
the fact that philosophy is not identified with 
knowledge of God, it is obliged to Christian 
theology in what concerns its rationality.  It is 
because of this obligation that one could develop 
theo-logia, that is knowledge of God whose 
foundation comes from God himself. In this sense 
faith has its duty with respect to reason because it 
has duty with respect to itself. (See (Marion 
2010[2], pp. 17-29). 
37 See a book of  (Albert 1992) where its author 
develops an idea of critical methodology of 
knowledge with following from there criticism with 
respect to theology.  
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immunisation” from any criticism with 
respect to basic dogmas of faith. This 
concerns first of all of the central 
theological conviction of existence of God. 
Since no rational demonstration of such an 
existence is possible, so that any possible 
statements about God can be doubted and 
hence criticised, theology  immunizes  this 
aspect of faith from  any rational critique 
and thus it falls into the fallacy of 
dogmatism, that is an arbitrary chosen 
premise for any further deductions. In view 
of these accusations, our main concern 
here is the following: if the followers of 
“critical rationalism” charge religion and 
theology with dogmatism and 
irrationalism, how can theology, according 
to our view, be a universal tool for 
criticising secular thinking and science?  
How it is possible that behind the alleged 
irrationality of theology there is something 
which  makes it “rational” in the sense of 
being able to oversee and justify all 
discourse based on the rationality of 
reason. In other words, could theology 
respond to “critical rationalism” through 
its critique? The answer to this question is 
already present in history of thought and it 
further explication could form a separate 
research on science and religion.38 Here we 
would just like to provide a very brief 
response, related to our claim that theology 
is destined to exercise critique of secular 
thinking. 
 
 Any philosophical strategy with 
respect to science, including that of 
“critical rationalism” leaves one basic 
question unanswered despite a continuing 
criticism and revision of scientific views of 
the world. This question is about the very 
                                                
38 See, for example, H. Küng’s response to Albert’s 
critical assessment of theology in its pretension for 
rationality in (Küng 1978, pp. 324-39, 439-51). 
facticity, that is the very possibility of 
scientific  advance which allegedly goes 
along the lines of “critical rationality”. As 
we mentioned above this advance and 
“critical rationality”, acting upon it, does 
not understand its sense and its goal. Its 
telos, if it is somehow envisaged, must, 
from the point of view of critical 
rationalists be corrigible and amendable, 
that is contingent and historically 
adjustable. But such a critical approach to 
the ways of human knowledge as part of 
life leaves humanity with the state of 
despair, cosmic homelessness and non-
attunement   to the universe which have 
been mentioned before. Theology in this 
sense provides human search for truth with 
teleology in the sense of orientation,  
recourse to what is solidly exist and  to the 
sense of what human life is about in the 
perspective of eternity. It  breathes a 
meaning into the disenchanted world so 
that human beings no longer suffer from 
being mere spectators staring at the 
universe’s emptiness. A critical function of 
theology is to override any form of 
mundane criticism based on scientific 
rationality and to extract out of this 
criticism an ultimate positive core of the 
human existence in the perspective of the 
promise of salvation.  To overcome the 
critique of theology from the side of 
critical realists, this theology must 
establish critique of the critique. Thus it 
must transcend in the name of restoring the 
home place for humanity.  Theology and 
theologians cannot permit anyone to 
prevent them from advocating and 
defending the humanity of the humans, 
naturalness of nature, justice of the police. 
Any cosmological theory with its advance 
of corrigible findings and mind-boggling 
discoveries must be subjected to an 
existential and hence theological critique: 
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the divine image of humanity must be 
preserved even if this cosmology “crushes 
man under the weight of the astronomical 
facts.”   
 
Theological commitment in a 
phenomenological modality: the 
centrality of person 
 
In its intrinsic critical function upon all 
social undertakings theology manifests 
itself in a phenomenological modality, that 
modality which studies, analyses and 
qualifies states of human consciousness by 
referring them to their ultimate source in 
persons who inhere their image in the 
Divine. Theology deals with phenomena, 
in human consciousness, of the presence of 
God, so that in this sense theology is the 
domain of phenomenology. However 
unlike classical philosophical 
phenomenology which fights against 
transcendence, ecclesial theology assumes 
the possibility of transcendence in its 
stance on humanity which, belonging to 
this world and articulating it, does not 
allow this world to swallow and reduce 
humanity to nothing. Here transcendence 
means the ability of human persons to 
preserve their otherness with respect to the 
universe even when this universe is 
effectively humanised through human 
articulation. However this otherness, 
understood theologically, if it is realised 
and preserved, and if it is developed and 
extended through the articulation of the 
universe,  contributes to the growth of 
religious faith. Thus theological 
commitment in cosmology, as the 
movement “beyond secular reason”, 
implies, through bringing personhood to its 
God-given centrality in being, the 
deepening and acquiring new experience  
of God which is manifested in new forms 
of thought and philosophical language. If 
cosmology considers itself as self-
generating knowledge in which God-given 
centrality of humanity is lost or distorted, 
human thinking of the universe and of its 
own position in it becomes imbued with 
the existentially irrational, the sense of 
homelessness, not being attuned with and 
incommensurable to the universe, leading 
to what Marcel described as the “crushing 
of man under the weight of astronomical 
facts”, that is to death which strips all 
sense and value of human life.  Seen in this 
perspective any cosmology, if it looses 
commitment to existential faith (not 
mentioning at all its Christian sense), that 
is, if it does not promote human life on this 
planet, can become a spiritually damaging 
practice, where the boundary between the 
human and inhuman in the universe can be 
trespassed and the sense of life is lost. All 
this means that the explication of 
theological commitment in cosmology 
implies the work of the spiritually 
enlightened reason  with the aim to 
explicate persons and their communal 
affinity to the Divine. 
 
 By using phenomenology as a 
methodological tool in explicating 
theological commitment we assume its 
extension beyond its “classical” sphere 
associated with Husserl and his 
followers.39 From a philosophical point of 
                                                
39 The scholars of Husserl pointed out that Husserl 
never talked about religion, God and mysticism  
explicitly in his published works.  Mall lists four 
books which concern with religious matters: The 
Crisis of the European Sciences, Erste Philosophie 
(Part 1), Zur Phänomenologie der 
Intersubjektivität, Vols. 1-2. Husserl, nevertheless, 
discusses religious issues in his unpublished 
manuscript. See details in (Mall 1991, p. 1). 
Assessing Husserl’s tension between his attitude  to 
the problem of God as being the founder of  
phenomenology, on the one hand,  and being a 
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view the extension of phenomenology 
towards theology (a so called “theological 
turn”) is not unproblematic (Janicaud 
1990) since it deviates from the initial 
objectives of phenomenology which was 
fighting against transcendence and made a 
methodological doubt of God through a 
phenomenological reduction (Husserl 
1998, § 58). The question is: do 
phenomena associated with the presence of 
the Divine retain in them something which 
does not exhaust them and does not allow 
their complete acquisition by 
consciousness?40  Such phenomena change 
                                                                    
Christian believer, on the other, Mall states that 
“the chasm between the God of phenomenology 
and that of theology remains unbridged till it is 
bridged either by a fulfilment of intended meaning 
of the concept of God or the reality of God makes 
its entrance unto human consciousness via the 
routes of a mystic experience, revelation, faith or 
grace. The path phenomenology has legitimately to 
traverse is only the former one and not the latter. 
Husserl might have reconciled the two in his own 
person. But that’s a different story, then….” (p.13). 
See also a book of (Housset 1997, pp. 265-290), 
where the reader will be able to find a 
comprehensive bibliography on Husserl’s 
involvement in religious issues; as well as a book of 
(Bello 2009).     
40 In order to clarify the sense of what is meant by 
this, it is worth quoting T. Torrance where he refers 
to the question posed by K. Barth: “How do we 
come to think, by means of our thinking, that which 
we cannot think at all by this means? How do we 
come to say, by means of our language, that which  
we cannot say at all by this means?”  There is 
always remains incongruence between God at the 
known and man as the knower.  However, if the 
knowledge of God is to take place it must rest upon 
reality and grace of the object known. In this case 
the reality of things reveals itself to us and acts in 
us even in that case when the link between our 
knowledge and language is irreducible to the 
intrinsic relations between thought and speech. “ 
we are, therefore, restricted to the harp alternatives: 
either to be entirety silent, that is not even to 
venture the sceptical question…as in regard  to the 
rationality of nature  or the laws of thought…; or to 
ask question only within the circle of the knowing 
relationship in order to test the nature and 
possibility of the rational structures within it” 
(Torrance 1997, pp. 54-55). Rephrasing this in 
the classical philosophical stance on the a-
priori character of the cognitive faculties 
and the ability to constitute phenomena as 
phenomena of consciousness. Theology 
benefits from the such a philosophical 
discussion because theology, having had 
duties with respect to reason, can be 
theoretically advanced for the dialogue 
with science to become more articulated in 
modern philosophical, linguistic and 
semantic formulae. This, in a way, 
constitutes a patristic ideal; 
correspondingly being in the same 
tradition contemporary theology should 
learn from the early theologians how to 
conduct a dialogue with science and 
philosophy by employing contemporary 
philosophical thought. In reference to the 
practices of the Fathers this constitutes a 
neo-patristic dimension of the dialogue of 
theology with science41 as another 
dimension of theological commitment.  
Correspondingly the explication of the 
theological commitment in cosmology 
becomes a contribution to this synthesis as 
the extension of old forms of thought and 
existential meanings towards our age.    
 
                                                                    
terms of postmodern philosophical theology, how 
one can speak of the transcendent?  Or, in other 
words, how can one speak of that which is 
incongruent  with language and orders of 
conceptual thinking? How can one conceptualise 
that which is intrinsically non-conceptual, pre-
conceptual or pre-theoretical? Will not be any 
speaking about phenomena whose phenomenality 
does not allow to be conceptualised a sort of 
violence and distortion with respect to these 
phenomena, reducing their phenomenality  to the 
circle of immanent consciousness and, thus, 
depriving them of their otherness, that is if that 
which is retained in them beyond their 
phenomenalisation by consciousness? See, for, 
example, (Marion 2002), (Smith 2002). 
41 On the dimensions of a neo-Patristic synthesis in 
the dialogue between theology and science see 
Nesteruk, The Universe as Communion.  
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 The theological commitment in 
cosmology implies a certain stance on 
anthropology, or personhood. It sees the 
split between faith and reason, or the split 
of intentionalities in one and the same 
human subjectivity, as the loss of centrality 
of human person in the dialogue. 
Correspondingly it is because of the 
advance of technology and science, which 
diminishes a personal dimension of 
existence, there is a growing concern about 
the respect of human dignity and freedom 
in our time. Humanity, understood 
theologically as events of hypostatic 
existence, manifests the living 
transcendence (through communion) and 
thus the possibility of reaching out to the 
transcendent, as that personal rationality 
through communion with which the world 
receives its meaning as the means of the 
dialogue between humanity and God. The 
dialogue between Christian theology and 
science becomes a radical form of the 
intellectual, cultural and spiritual 
mediation among all splits and 
disintegrations in human life. It 
demonstrates that there is a common 
ground for all humanity in otherness of 
God, as well as in consubstantiality with 
the universe. This position confirms an old 
patristic view that theology is a mode of 
life and the essence of the human condition 
is communion with the divine.  Within this 
perspective the dialogue between theology 
and science rejects either the dominance of 
pure faith or pure reason, for it considers 
both of them within the integrity of 
hypostatic humanity as two modes of 
participation in the divine.42 At the same 
                                                
42 This implies, according to Fr. D. Staniloae, that 
“any progress in understanding dogma depends in 
part on the progressive understanding that science 
has of the world”, however, and here he accentuates 
the theological commitment, “theological thinking 
time it does not want to consider theology 
as a dialect enclosed in itself and unrelated 
to other spheres of human reason, although 
it never adapts to any unquestioned norms 
of the secular reason.43 
 
 In a phenomenological perspective 
the problem of mediation between 
theology and science  can be formulated as 
the reconciliation of the two types of 
experience in one and the same human 
subjectivity. On the one hand, in science, 
this experience is empirical and theoretical, 
delivering to human subjectivity 
knowledge of things “present in their 
presence”. This is achieved by the fact that 
all phenomena related to the outside world 
are constituted within the immanence of 
the ego. Regardless as to whether one 
means empirical observations and 
controllable measurements, or 
mathematical statements, what is evident is 
that in all these cases the “reality of the 
outer world” is affirmed through the 
structures of the constituting subjectivity. 
On the one hand consciousness poses 
scientific phenomena outside itself making 
them objects , as if they exist separately 
and independently of the subject; on the 
other hand the form of the content of these 
phenomena is generated by the human 
subjectivity so that the form of these 
phenomena is immanent to human 
                                                                    
cannot be separated from spirituality”  and this is 
the reason why Orthodox theology “takes scientific 
progress into account only in so far as science 
makes a contribution to the progress of the human 
spirit, and only in so far as it deepens in man the 
experience of his own spiritual reality and of the 
supreme spiritual reality….” (Staniloae 1980, p. 
216). 
43 Here our position is reminiscent to some ideas 
from the so call “Radical Orthodoxy” theological 
movement. See, for example, a volume on the 
dialogue between Eastern Orthodoxy and “Radical 
Orthodoxy” (Pabst, Schneider 2009).  
 
 34 
consciousness.  Thus the transcending 
tendencies in scientific knowledge are 
present in the very foundation of its natural 
attitude, whereas phenomenology attempts 
to clarify the sense of this transcendence 
by referring the to the subjective pole of 
knowledge. Scientific phenomena, 
articulated as certain transcendences of the 
sphere of subjectivity, can be represented 
discursively as objects that manifest 
themselves as being poor in terms of their 
intuitive content, that content which forms 
an invisible and silent context of that 
objective reality which appears through the 
procedures of science.  In other words, by 
making phenomena objective in a 
scientific sense, what is left behind is the 
intuitive content of the life of 
consciousness which cannot be 
phenomenalised at all; thus human 
subjectivity cannot be reduced to that 
which is phenomenalised; hence there is 
something in this subjectivity – its 
personal, hypostatic centre – which passes 
over any scientific presentation of life. 
Thus human persons transcend the 
scientifically organised universe in a very 
sophisticated sense: even if cosmology 
asserts human existence as insignificant, it 
cannot remove the intuitive content of the 
trans-worldly dimension which pertains to 
human persons as divine-made agencies. 
Thus when the scientific mind poses 
physical reality as objective and 
independent of human insight, it is not as if 
human history has been “cosmosized”, that 
is placed in the cosmic context, being 
reduced to the necessities of substances 
and the laws of the universe. It is 
completely opposite: the universe is being 
humanized, becoming the content and 
structure of the human subjectivity as part 
of the unfolding human history. The 
universe becomes immanent to humanity 
whereas humanity retains its transcendence 
to it.  In spite of the fact that this 
transcendence is always in place and is the 
motivating force of any scientific enquiry, 
which never stops because science never 
abolishes the freedom of humanity to 
progress beyond the already achieved, it is 
this very science which cannot give an 
account for the ground of this 
transcendence because it does not account 
for persons.  The dissatisfaction of science 
by its inability to account for the 
contingent facticity of personhood leads, in 
a paradoxical way, to its fight against 
transcendence as the retaining of those 
foundational intuitive existential contexts 
which make possible any scientific 
articulation.  
 
 Theology exhibits a clear 
difference with science:  it claims that it is 
possible to accept the phenomena of the 
divine as absolute, unconditioned by 
thought or speech, that is to  retain as 
“present in absence” that which is beyond 
the expression of what is given or 
revealed, that is beyond of that which can 
be phenomenalised. On the one hand the 
phenomena of the divine are immanent 
because they belong to human experience, 
on the other hand they are transcendent 
because they cannot be phenomenalised 
within the rubrics of pure thought and 
language because of its inability to exhaust 
by means of signifiers that which it is 
supposed to signify. One can say that 
theology retains transcendence in 
immanence. Here classical 
phenomenology, with its philosophical 
respect for immanence,  enters an 
irresolvable conflict with theology. 
According to classical phenomenology the 
phenomenality of God, as well as the 
underlying facticity of science, would be 
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forbidden, insofar as they re-establish 
transcendence as opposed to the reduction 
which attempts to neutralise it. Science is 
not subjected to this problem to the same 
extent because the scientific discourse does 
not attempt to see the “other” side of 
physical phenomena, that side which is 
responsible for their contingent facticity. 
In science human subjectivity operates in 
the natural attitude by affirming objects of 
the universe as existing outside and 
independently of this subjectivity. 
However, the facticity of that givenness of 
objects of physics, that is their articulated 
phenomenality, lies in that same 
subjectivity which attempts to be 
abstracted from them. If in theology the 
problem of the phenomenalisation of the 
divine coincides with the problem of 
theology’s facticity, in science the obvious 
phenomenalisation of the finite things and 
events does not naturally bring human 
subjectivity to an enquiry about the 
facticity of science which explicates these 
phenomena.  Science can effectively 
function within the sphere of immanence 
of that subjectivity which generates it, 
remaining merely an efficient tool, the 
very possibility of which remains obscure 
(Gurwitsch 1966, 399-400).  
 
 Then a reasonable question arises 
with respect to the dialogue between 
theology and science: what is really meant 
by the dialogue between theology, which 
implies transcendence in its very 
definition, and science, whose monism, as 
immanentism, is implanted in scientific 
methodology so that transcendence is 
precluded? The situation is aggravated by 
the fact that transcendence is not self-
evident even in theology if it is taken in a 
purely philosophical mode. That 
philosophical theology which considers 
God in terms of existence and real 
transcendence, causality and substance, is 
subject to a phenomenological critique: 
God is disqualified from being a 
phenomenon. In contradistinction to this, 
the theology of experience is based on 
facts and manifestations linked to the 
Scriptures and Eucharistic communion and 
here we deal with such phenomena which 
render a sort of concealment, not being 
fully disclosed through those aspects of 
intuition which cascade towards 
expression. In other words, theology 
understood as experience deals with 
phenomena which are pre-theoretical. 
Hence there is a general problem of how to 
express theoretically, pre-theoretical 
experience; for example, how to employ 
thought and speech in order to express that 
which, by intuition,  cannot be thought and 
spoken of, that is, that which exceeds the 
limits of the constituting ego. In other 
words, how is it possible to retain the 
transcendence of God while speaking and 
thinking of him within the immanence of 
human subjectivity? Evidently, a similar 
question must be formulated with respect 
to the universe: how to retain the 
transcendence of the universe as a whole 
while speaking and thinking of its 
observable and non-observable parts 
within the immanent subjectivity.   
 
 The Greek patristic response to 
such questions would be that knowledge  
of God cannot be exhausted by reason and 
its linguistic means; theology operates with 
metaphors and allegories which, however, 
reflect  existential, precategorical and 
pretheoretical truth. The challenge to 
philosophical theology, which appropriates 
existential truth of God within the limits of 
reason, is to overcome the 
phenomenalisation of the transcendent and 
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thus to preserve transcendence in 
immanence. In different words, theology 
has to deal with the intrinsic ambivalence 
of the givenness of the divine, that is, with 
its “presence but in absence”.  If theology, 
being scrutinised by philosophical thought, 
is in need of justification of its own ability 
to retain transcendence within the sphere 
of phenomenality of consciousness, 
cosmology, if it intends to engage with 
religion, needs a similar sort of 
justification but to a much wider extent. 
This implies that the problem of mediation 
between theology and cosmology  requires 
one to deal with a generic issue of the 
possibility of transcendence in cosmology. 
In more specific words: in what sense does 
intrinsic immanence of scientific assertions 
about reality retain in itself the elements of 
transcendence; or how the theoretical 
speech of scientific discourse retains the 
signs of that otherworldly ground of the 
overall facticity, which is fundamentally 
pretheoretical. One must not be surprised 
that this question is formulated by persons. 
In other words the retaining of 
transcendence means here the 
transcendence of persons as not reduced to 
that which is phenomenalised by the 
sciences.  Seen in this way the difference 
between science (cosmology) and theology 
can be described in terms of the difference 
in expressing experience of transcendence.  
 
The explication of this last 
mentioned difference and the outline of the 
ways of reintegration of intentionalities 
employed in science and theology can be 
made on the level of those border-line 
situations where the excess of intuition of a 
phenomenon effectively blocks its 
discursive exhaustion and renders in it 
something which has not been intended 
and conditioned by experience. Here 
cosmology provides us with at least two 
issues relevant to our concern: cosmology 
of the origination of the universe as a 
single and unrepeatable event, and the 
issue of position of humanity in the 
universe in the perspective of an 
unrepeatable and incommunicable event of 
embodiment (incarnation) of every human 
person. The universe appears to humanity 
as given in its contingent facticity, but its 
sense and origin are not comprehended by 
humanity. Humanity, on the contrary, is 
comprehended on the basis of the event of 
communion with the universe  in the very 
measure that this event is not 
comprehended. Similarly  the event of 
birth as contingent hypostatic incarnation 
(the event of hypostasis in Levinas’ 
terminology (Levinas 1987, pp. 42-43), is 
not comprehended by the personal 
subjectivity (this event does not show itself 
to subjectivity) but this person is 
comprehended on the basis of this event in 
the very measure that the person itself does 
not comprehend the event.44 It is the 
inability to comprehend the sense of 
embodiment in its hypostatic facticity that 
makes the problem of origin of the 
universe as well as the problem of origin 
of the personal existence one and the same 
                                                
44 A hypostatic human being appears to itself 
without controlling the conditions of its contingent 
appearance but attempting to phenomenalise it 
through the flow of life as directed to the future. In 
different words, subjectivity is extended here  
towards a non-intentional immanence, or reversed 
intentionality where the ego  finds itself subject to, 
but not subject of, a givenness.  The I no longer 
precedes the  phenomena that it constitutes but is 
instead called into being as the one who receives 
this intentionality. The sense of the I is driven not 
by preconceived forms of subjectivity but by events 
whose sense is not immediately accessible to 
subjectivity but unfolds in time: the more we 
progress in time in seeing the universe, the more we 
comprehend the sense of its past; the more we grow 
in our life, the more sense we constitute out of the 
fact of our coming into being. 
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unsolvable metaphysical mystery (c.f. 
Marcel 1965, p. 24). Correspondingly, one 
can speak about incommensurability of the 
universe as well as the facticity of personal 
existence to all forms of conceptual 
thinking. It is the inability to comprehend 
the pre-theoretical and pre-conceptual in 
the givenness of the universe to human 
person  as well as the givenness of the 
person to itself, that indicates that the 
universe and person show themselves in 
rubrics of immanent consciousness while 
remaining incomprehensible and retaining 
inexhaustability in terms of conceptual 
thinking. 
 
Concluding remarks   
 
The existential and phenomenological 
explication of the theological commitment 
in modern cosmology as the unfolding of 
the sense of the universe from within 
communion events entails that cosmology, 
in a way, turns out to be “subordinated” to  
anthropology. Philosophically this means 
that the interpretation of cosmological 
ideas is based on the epistemological 
centrality of humanity as such a kind of 
being from within which that which is 
called “the universe” is disclosed and 
constituted.  Theologically, this means that 
the sense of the universe is established 
from within the relations between God and 
man, that is from within a concrete earthly 
history being an arena for these relations. 
As was expressed by C. Yannaras, if “the 
entire fact of the world to be constituted as 
an existential fact, then every reality is 
recapitulated in the relationship of 
humanity with an active reason (logos) as 
an invitation-to-relationship, which is 
directed towards humanity alone” 
(Yannaras 2004, p. 137). In both 
philosophical and theological aspects of 
such an approach to the universe one can 
find a phenomenological reversal of the 
anthropological problem: humanity is not 
inserted in the allegedly pre-existing 
cosmic history but, on the contrary, 
cosmological evolution has its origin in the 
history of the human as that primary and 
inherent existential beginning of any 
possible articulation of the world. This 
beginning expresses that which G. Marcel 
called the initial and unresolvable mystery 
of the human existence (Marcel 1965, p. 
24). It is that mystery which is associated 
with the fact of humanity’s creaturehood, 
its mystical coming into being through the 
act of the Divine love. It is the stance on 
the spiritual centrality of humanity in the 
universe and the presence of the Divine 
image in articulations of the universe 
which constitutes the essence of the 
theological commitment in studying the 
universe. A phenomenological method of 
treating the content of cosmological 
theories as the content of human 
experience, so to speak, their 
interiorisation by the ego, explicates a 
simple eidetic truth that cosmology 
manifests the spiritual condition of 
humanity, that condition which is 
subjected to a trial of free thinking of the 
universe. Physical cosmology mercilessly 
dooms human beings to homelessness in 
the universe, their mediocrity and effective 
non-existence in the divided, and 
sometimes non-consubstantial layers of 
physical reality. By so doing it subjects the 
human spirit  to a severe test  of resisting 
despair and oblivion and encourages 
transcendence, that is the sense of its 
commensurability with the eternal as the 
God-given ability to contemplate all 
temporal and spatial extensions (diastema)  
as having origin in the same otherness of 
their creation which consciousness has. 
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 If one places such a vision of the 
universe in a cosmographic context, the 
resulting  “spiritual cosmology” turns out 
to be geocentric, because it is 
anthropocentric.  However this 
egocentricity has a theological  foundation, 
for the meeting of God with humanity took 
place on Earth and it is in this event 
through which the basic divisions in 
creation  have been archetypically 
overcome and brought to the unity. Then 
that geocentrism which pertains to the fact 
that the universe is disclosed from a 
specific and contingent location in the 
universe becomes an expression of the 
Christocentric essence of cosmology, for 
the very possibility of the integral 
knowledge of the physically disjoint world 
has its origin in the archetype of the Divine 
image in man, that is of Christ, understood 
not only as a carrier of the human nature, 
but also as the Logos-Word of God who 
did not cease to be at the right hand side of 
the Father and who continuously sustains 
creation and its economy at all scales and 
all remote corners of the universe. It is this 
archetype, when Christ is treated as the 
Lord of the world (Rev 1:16), which is 
gifted to humanity in order it could know 
the universe at the scales which 
incommensurably exceed in depth as well 
as at large the physical and biological 
parameters of the human existence. One 
can say that the very possibility of 
knowing the universe becomes in a certain 
way the experiencing of the event of the 
Incarnation of the Lord of the worlds from 
within which the universe manifests itself 
as an event of the human history.  
 
 If, for a moment, one disregards a 
theological stance on the human existence 
and approaches it on the grounds of the 
physical and biological, as well as 
cognitive facticity, including the faculty of 
the rational comprehension of the world, 
the universe will appear to us from within 
the transcendental delimiters which pertain 
to the human condition. The universe is 
constituted from within these delimiters so 
that the picture of the universe comprises 
not only that which can be 
phenomenalised, that is represented as 
objects, but the very conditions of the 
possibility of such a constitution.  The 
possibility of elucidating these conditions 
in the strict discourse of the natural 
sciences seems to be doubtful. If one 
assumes that the cognitive faculties as well 
as human reason have foundation in 
something physical and biological, one 
looses here the problem of hypostatic, that 
is personal existence, for personhood is 
that aspect of the individually 
unrepeatable, isomorphic to the world 
existence with respect to which science can 
only think in terms of riddles. It is because 
of this that theology enters a cosmological 
discourse as a pointer to that from which 
the transcendental  delimiters in the 
constitution of the universe can originate, 
namely to the Divine image in man.  In 
this sense the explication of  those 
epistemic procedures which are employed 
in cosmology, in its essence, will be the 
explication of content of the idea of the 
divine image in man, or, to be more 
precise, of that impetus which is still 
acting in humanity’s postlapserian 
condition and which attempts to restore the 
distorted image. Correspondingly, the 
method of such an explication, based in 
transcendental philosophy and 
phenomenology, becomes intrinsically 
manifesting that theological commitment 
which implicitly present in cosmology.  
Our desire to reflect upon knowledge of 
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the universe from within experience of life 
corresponds to that endeavour of the 
modern philosophy of religion which 
overcomes that which Heidegger named 
“ontotheology”. In view of the objectives 
and tasks of the present research this 
would mean the overcoming of 
“ontocosmology” as that abstract science 
of the universe as a whole which, 
ultimately, in analogy with ontotheology  
must lead to the “death of the universe”, 
certainly not in a physical, but  moral  
sense, as that kind of being which is 
devoid of the value and beauty by which 
the cosmos of ancient Greeks was filled in.  
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